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They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.'
I. Introduction
In the fear-drenched weeks that followed the September 11, 2001
(9/11) terrorist attacks on American soil, a timid Congress hastily passed
laws expanding government surveillance and incursions into privacy,2 and
contemplated other, more intrusive measures.3  Meanwhile, the U.S.
I BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759), in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 422 (14th ed. 1968); Patricial Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National
Security with Privacy Under the USA Patriot Act, 80 DENV. U.L. REV. 375, 426-27 n.409 (quoting
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA (1759), in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 310 (Justin Kaplin ed., 16th ed. 1992)).
2 Foremost among these measures is the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act]; ELAINE CASSEL, THE WAR ON CIVIL LIBERTIES:
How BUSH AND ASHCROFT HAVE DISMANTLED THE BILL OF RIGHTS 20 (2004). The Patriot Act was
passed "in haste, with virtually no congressional debate and little commentary in the press... Id. The
House of Representatives passed the Patriot Act on a 357-66 vote, while the Senate tally was 98-1;
President George W. Bush signed it into law on October 26, 2001. Id. at 17. The Patriot Act increases the
scope of personal information that the government can access while reducing independent judicial
oversight, and it creates a "systematic circumvention of established doctrine and procedures guarding
against unreasonable government intrusion."; Mell, supra note 1, at 379, 426; HERBERT N. FOERSTEL,
REFUGE OF A SCOUNDREL: THE PATRIOT ACT IN LIBRARIES 69 (2004). The Patriot Act:
has had a more disastrous effect on personal privacy than any other statute in American
history .... The most dangerous provisions of the Patriot Act are those that merge
foreign intelligence procedures with criminal law enforcement, bringing the CIA into
domestic surveillance and allowing the FBI to conduct criminal investigations under
the lower legal standards originally intended only for foreign intelligence activities.
Indeed, the smoke screen of anti-terrorism has obscured the fact that the Patriot Act
altered the rules of criminal law enforcement more than it assisted the war on terrorism.
Id.
3 Mark G. Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Governmental
Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1063 (2001). Advocates and even legislators on both sides of
the political aisle were "[a]larmed by [the] haste and lack of thoughtful deliberation" that attended the
initial flurry of anti-terrorism legislation immediately following 9/11 and challenged the wisdom, motive
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Department of Justice (DOJ) altered Bureau of Prisons regulations to allow
government monitoring of attorney-client communications.4 Under these
regulations, where the attorney general has reasonable suspicion to believe
that an inmate may use communications with his attorney to "further or
facilitate acts of terrorism," the government may monitor or review
communications between the inmate and the attorney and attorney's agents.5
These communications are traditionally covered by the attorney-client
privilege. 6 Under this scenario, the government would set up a "taint team" to
monitor the attorney-client communication.7 The taint team would be kept
separate from the prosecution and would be prohibited from disclosing the
monitored information unless it determined that acts of "terrorism or
violence" are imminent or a federal judge approved such disclosure.8
Monitoring communications between prisoners and outsiders has
been allowed for "security" purposes for some time. 9 But even in prison,
attorney-client conversations have been protected, because prisoners have an
expectation of privacy when conversing with their attorneys.' 0 The Bureau
of Prisons regulation promulgated by the DOJ under former Attorney
General John Ashcroft appears to have altered this standard. The regulation
has been attacked in legal literature. The regulation has been attacked in
legal literature as, inter alia, an assault on the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel as well as an erosion of the traditional
attorney-client privilege,, but there has been little judicial analysis so far. "
One case in which the defendant challenged the regulation was thrown out
for lack of standing. 12 In a second case, involving alleged terrorists detained
at a U.S. military base at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, the court found that the
government's requirement of real-time monitoring of attorney-client
communications and review of legal mail "impermissibly burden the
and constitutionality of certain proposals. Id.; Editorial, At Vhat Price Security, NEWSDAY, Nov. 25,
2001, at B02. "[Blefore the ink was dry on [the post 9/11] sweeping expansion of law enforcement
power, the administration unilaterally pushed the envelope further with orders for military tribunals,
detentions and dragnets, and eavesdropping on conversations between attorneys and their clients." Id.;
Associated Press, Taking liberties; Greater Access Sought to Social Security Data, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
8, 2001, at A3. "AN ANTI-TERRORISM LAW... allows the FBI to shift its focus from solving crimes
to gathering domestic intelligence. The Treasury Department has been charged with putting together a
financial-intelligence-gathering system. And the CIA now has the authority to influence the FBI's
domestic surveillance." id.
4 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2005)
5 Id.
6 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2005)
7 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3) (2005); 66 Fed Reg. 55,062, 55,064 (2001).
8 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3) (2005); 66 Fed Reg. 55,062, 55,064 (containing former Attorney
General Ashcroft's comments regarding 28 C.F.R. §§ 500, 501).
9 United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 116 n.2 (6th Cir. 1980).
10 United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 291 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996).
1 See infra Part IV (discussing the lack of judicial analysis and the resulting court split).
12 Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2003).
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attorney-client relationship and abrogate the attendant attorney-client
privilege.' 3 Even this court, however, so severely restricts the inmate's
access to counsel as to raise Sixth Amendment concerns. For example, each
inmate may confer with only one attorney, and that attorney must treat all
information relating to such conference as confidential, and is not even
allowed to share the information with "law firm colleagues or support staff'
without government review.1 4  It seems inconceivable that a defendant,
accused of so serious a crime as an act of terrorism, can receive a
constitutionally adequate defense from just one lawyer who is unable to
confer with other counsel or even benefit from so basic a service as support
staffing.
Because future terrorist attacks could better be prevented through a
more sensible and peaceable foreign policy than the United States currently
is pursuing, this Article urges against the erosion of the attorney-client
privilege occasioned by war-on-terrorism policy-making and calls on courts
to defend this all-important privilege. Part II elucidates some historical
points of interest relating to the privilege and the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. This part also takes note of the increasing
level of secrecy shrouding government and of court responses to government
attempts to hold legal hearings behind close doors. Part III examines the
provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 relevant to government monitoring of
inmate-attorney interactions, offering a critique of the government's legal
justifications for the provisions. Part IV reviews the few existing court cases
that address these provisions, finding that one court has sought to protect the
attorney-client privilege, but possibly only at the expense of the effectiveness
of counsel available to the defendant. Finally, Part V concludes that the
Constitution commends strong protection of the right to effective assistance
of counsel and the privilege of confidentiality between attorney and client,
and courts should not stand by while the government doggedly chips away at
these longstanding protections.
IL Background
The war on terror, and its inexorable link with the nation's enormous
appetite for oil,' 5 has tainted the nation's appearance in the court of world
opinion with blood from Iraqi battlefields and prisons. It has also propelled a
13 Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2004).
14 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
15 Jim Mullins, Follow the Pipeline, S. FL. SUN-SENTINAL, Dec. 28, 2004, at 19A. "It's now
apparent that the Bush administration's Afghan invasion had two purposes, one laudable and unfinished-
the destruction of al-Qaida-and the other for the site of a Central Asian pipeline." Id.; David Hale, The
Prohibitive Cost of a New US Imperialism, BusINEss TIMES SINGAPORE, Apr. 4, 2003.
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general erosion in the United States of civil liberties and, specifically, of the
attorney-client privilege.16  "Obvious[ly], the 'war on terror' invasion of Iraq
was based on fabrication rather than the reality of consolidating U.S. control
of Middle Eastern oil.' 17 Following the energy crunch of the 1970s, energy
efficiency increased and oil consumption dropped as a result of the use of
more fuel-thrifty automobiles, better home insulation, and improved
appliances and manufacturing techniques. 18  While energy consumption
relative to economic output continued its decline even after the incentive for
fuel efficiency evaporated in the face of $10-per-barrel oil in the late 1990s,
the transportation sector has suffered from the "relentless promotion of high-
profit sport utility vehicles," increasing the demand for oil. 19 Most alarming
is that United States oil consumption continues to escalate as domestic
production has hit a 50-year low. 20 The result is that is that the nation relies
on foreign sources for 58 percent of its petroleum supply.2' Much of this oil
comes from unstable regions such as the Persian Gulf and South America.22
In a geopolitical sense, the Bush strategy in Iraq has worked against
U.S. interests, because sabotage of Iraqi oil fields has spread to Saudi Arabia,
16 Luke Peter, The Phony Campaign Begins, THE PRESS (Christchurch, New Zealand), Jan. 22,
2005, at 11. New Zealand Green Party leader links "the erosion of human rights [with] an oilfield-
inspired war on terror." Id.
17 Mullins, supra note 14.
18 Russell Sadler, What Energy Crisis, DENVER POST, May 13, 2001, at E-05 ("From 1973
to 2000, the U.S. economy became 42 percent less energy 'intense,' according to the Department of
Energy's monthly review. This jargon simply means it took less energy to produce the same amount of
goods and services.").
19 Michael Hiltzik, We're All to Blame for Pump Prices, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at Cl. "You
want to know why our oil consumption is out of control? Take a look at the 3 2-ton vehicular pachyderm
blasting down the freeway next to you with two passengers inside, getting seven miles to the gallon....
According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, the average fuel economy of new vehicles today is the
lowest it has been since 1986." Id.; Sadler, supra note 18; Hale, supra note 15; Paul Krugman,
Editorial: The Oil Crunch, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at 31; see also Editorial, End of Cheap Oil is a
Blessing, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 13, 2005, at A23 [hereinafter Editorial] ("Artificially low gas prices have
long stifled conservation efforts and alternative technologies, while fuelling a boom in vehicles so
grotesquely inefficient that.., our children will someday marvel at them in a museum.").
20 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Country Analysis Briefs: United States of
America, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabsUsa/Oil.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006); Hiltzik, supra note
19. The U.S. Senate in 1990 considered increasing the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards required of automakers to an extent that would currently save the nation enough oil to cut
imports by about one quarter, but "[t]he idea flopped." Id. CAFE was instituted in 1975, two years after
the first Arab oil shock, when the average fuel economy for cars was 13.5 miles per gallon (mpg) and for
trucks 11.6 mpg. Id. The CAFE standards required fuel economy for cars to reach 27.5 mpg after several
years but "light trucks were given a pass, on the reasoning that they were only 20% of the market anyway.
Refashioned as SUVs, they've become 50% of the market." Id.
21 U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabsUsaOil.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
22 Id.
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raising fears or radicalization throughout the Middle East.23 Meanwhile,
however short-sighted the promotion of gas-guzzling vehicles, the greater
near-future threat to economic (and political) stability are oil-gulping
developing nations that put pressure on demand, and thus prices, for
petroleum. 24  "We can neither drill nor conquer our way out of this
problem. '25  Yet the Bush Administration, "quixotic[ally]," proposes to do
just that.26 Ironically, U.S. taxpayers shoulder the cost-and the risk-borne
by the oil industry, pouring billions in tax subsidies a year into this already
mature industry. 27  This heavily subsidized cheap power has "reaped
incredible economic and environmental costs that now may be more
expensive than the power they provide., 28  Considering that the current
Administration's oil-reliant energy policy underlies its "war on terror"
efforts, the question arises whether there would be a need to be involved in
the Middle East had the United States taken the many billions of dollars that
it poured into the dying oil industry and instead had invested the money in
renewable energy, such as solar and wind power. Though today's politicians
will never admit it, widespread reliance on renewable or green energy is
entirely realistic in the not-so-distant future-even an oil company recently
admitted as much.29 The renewable energy sector is now the fastest growing
in the world.30 The civil liberties of Americans and the security of the nation
no doubt would be more reliably ensured had U.S. leaders concluded earlier
23 Krugman, supra note 19. "It has been interesting to watch people who lauded George Bush's
leadership in the war on terror come to the belated realization that Mr. Bush has given Osama bin Laden
exactly what he wanted." Id.
24 Id. In the days preceding Labor Day weekend, 2005, gasoline prices surpassed the all-time
high that Americans had paid at the pump. Id.; James F. Peltz et al., Bush Moves to Avert Gas Shortages,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A16. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which caused a reduction in oil
production as it slammed into the Gulf Coast of the United States on August 29, 2005, gas prices soared
past $3 per gallon in many parts of the country. Id. Once gas prices have topped $3.05 per gallon, they
surpass the inflation-adjusted price of gas in March 1981 following the Iranian revolution, which then
stood at $1.417 per gallon and represented the previous all-time high. Id.
25 Krugman, supra note 19.
26 Pete Morton, Energy in Mind; Bush Administration Energy Bill a Costly Assault on
Environment, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 19, 2004, at 12C. Administration supported a "myopic
energy bill that [would] cost taxpayers $19 billion in subsidies and tax breaks for the oil and gas industries
and encourage air and water pollution while sacrificing our public lands." Id.
27 Mark Detsky, The Global Light: An Analysis of International and Local Developments in the
Solar Electric Industry and Their Lessons for United States Energy Policy, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 301, 322 (2003). "[Tlired fossil fuel industries are paid at every stage of the economic process, to
the point that the oil and gas industry will not begin a major project without federal government
assurances that the United States will pick up the shortfall when they lose money." Id. The author further
citing a "vast network of subsidies and tax incentives to fossil fuel companies." Id. American taxpayers
are not alone-Canadians lavished US$4.75 billion of their hard-earned money on the fossil-fuel industry
in that nation in 2004. Id.; Editorial, supra note 19.
28 Detsky, supra note 27, at 322.
29 Editorial, supra note 19. According to Shell International, "renewable sources could supply 50
per cent of the world's energy needs by 2050." Id.
30 Id.
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that heightened efficiency in the transportation sector and development of
renewable power were worthy of a concentrated national focus.
A. War on Civil Liberties
The term "civil liberties" dates to the mid-seventeenth century and
incorporates the most elemental freedoms inherent in the mind, body, home
and church as well as travel and association.31  The U.S. Constitution
guarantees these rights in the Bill of Rights.32 These rights have been placed
at risk, and in some cases outright undermined, in the current war on
terrorism. In the eyes of some, the War on Terrorism might better be named
the War on Civil Liberties. For example, Judge Tashima, a federal appellate
judge who was imprisoned along with other Americans of Japanese ancestry
during World War II in an internment camp in Arizona, said the war on
terrorism "threatens to destroy the very values of a democratic society
governed by the rule of law., 33 Comparing the current political climate with
that surrounding his World War fl-era detention in Arizona, the judge added,
"It's happening all over again."
34
The passage of the Patriot Act provides good reason for such
concern, because it allows the government to subvert the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. For example, since the beginning of this century, the
government has stepped up efforts to mute expression of dissent protected
under the First Amendment by fencing off the public forum, restricting
access to the public forum via privatization, and engaging in viewpoint
discrimination by barring protesters who oppose the government's viewpoint
from a public venue.35 Some cities, including New York, have made it more
31 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 3.
32 Id.; U.S. CONST. amends. I - X.
33 Steve Hymon, Rights a Victim of Terror War, U.S. Judge Says, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at
B3 (quoting United States Court of Appeals Judge A. Wallace Judge Tashima, speaking at a conference
on the civil rights cases challenging the World War H-era internments).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Tashima also criticized the government for
interrogating people based only on race and for conducting searches without probable cause of Internet,
library and university records. Id. Another former detainee at an internment camp told the Los Angeles
Times, "A lot of people now are governed by fear. There are friends of mine who say racial prejudice can
be justified. ... They really believe it. It's scary the way things are going. But I think people are going to
be outraged sooner or later." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
35 See generally Chris Ford, Reclaiming the Public Forum: Courts Must Stand Firm Against
Governmental Efforts to Displace Dissidence, 2 TENN. J. LAW & POL'Y (accepted for publication, Winter
2006), available at BEPRESS LEGAL REPOSITORY, http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/464 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2006); FOERSTEL, supra note 2, at 127. Moreover, when he toured the country to sell the Patriot
Act, Ashcroft held carefully scripted media events that excluded the public, prompting Vermont Congress
member Bernie Sanders to comment, "It is a bit ironic that Attorney General Ashcroft is using closed
meetings to try to build public support for a law that expands secret court proceedings." Id.
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difficult to acquire a permit to protest government policies.36 One court, in
upholding the city's denial of a permit to protesters, appeared more worried
about the condition of the grass in Central Park than the right to free speech
in a public forum.37 Moreover, apparently fearing that there is a terror plot
behind every anti-war protest, the DOJ issued grand jury subpoenas for every
person who attended a peace rally at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa,
demanded the membership list of the rally's sponsor, the National Lawyers
Guild, and ordered Drake University to turn over academic records of
students who attended the rally.38 This was an unconstitutional infringement
on the participants' freedom of association and appears to have been
intended to chill participation in such events.39 Besides chilling speech and
association protected by the First Amendment,40 the war on terror, through
36 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 180; Ford, supra note 35, at 48-50.
37 Ford, supra note 35, at 49-50. "Most disconcerting, however, is that the court seemed to
bolster its decision not to grant an injunction on behalf of the plaintiffs that the city permit them to use the
Great Lawn [in Central Park] because to open the park to the dissident groups might encourage more
people to attend their event." Id. at 50; Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp.
2d 258, 261, 262, 263--64, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
38 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 179.
39 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) ("[llmmunity from state scrutiny of
membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of
the members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so
doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
40 Doe v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. District Lexis 19403 (D. Conn. 2005); Doe v. Ashcroft, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In both cases, plaintiffs were served with national security letters (NSLs),
requiring them to produce customer records. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19403 at *5; Ashcroft, 344
F. Supp. 2d at 474-75. The Ashcroft Court described NSLs as "a unique form of administrative subpoena
cloaked in secrecy and pertaining to national security issues." Ashcroft at 475. The NSLs in these cases
were issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 to a library and an Internet service provider, respectively. Gonzales,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19403 at *2, *5; Ashcroft, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75. Significant to First
Amendment challenges of the statute is that it prohibits an NSL recipient from disclosing "to any person
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or records." 18
U.S.C. § 2709(c). The government has claimed authorization to keep such information in "perpetual
secrecy." Ashcroft, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 519. Both the Gonzales and Ashcroft courts rejected this view,
holding that to preclude a party from disclosing that it even received an NSL seeking customer records
violates the First Amendment. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19403 at *45; Ashcroft, 344 F. Supp. 2d
at 475, 524-25. According to the Gonzales Court:
[Section] 2709(c) creates a unique situation in which the only people who possess non-
speculative facts about the reach of broad, federal investigatory authority are barred from
discussing their experience with the public.... The potential for abuse is written into the
statute: the very people who might have information regarding investigative abuses and
overreaching are preemptively prevented from sharing that information with the public
and with the legislators who empower the executive branch with the tools used to
investigate matters of national security.
Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19403 at *43-44.
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the Patriot Act, abridges the Fourth,4 1 Fifth,4 2 and, most important here, Sixth
Amendment rights.43
41 Doe v. Ashcroft, 344 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474-75, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); CASSEL, supra note 2, at
5. The Patriot Act gives attorney general "carte blanche" to seize computer, phone, mail, business and
medical records with no notice simply by alleging an interest in national security. Id.
42 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 5. The government violates Due Process Clause by shutting down,
freezing assets of and investigating directors of Muslim charities based on secret evidence; maintaining
secret "no fly" lists from which there is no means to remove names; imprisoning Grand Jury witnesses or
targets of government interrogations indefinitely without filing charges; violating the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against self-incrimination by coercing confessions. Id.; Jeffrey Fleishman, Man's Claims May
Be a Look at Dark Side of War on Terror, L.A. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at Al. In what must be the most
harrowing account of a U.S.-backed forced detention and attempt to coerce a confession, a German citizen
native to Lebanon on a bus ride through former Yugoslavia was kidnapped in Macedonia and held captive
for 23 days, pushed to sign an admission that he had ties to al-Qaeda (which he did not do), beaten,
blindfolded, injected with drugs and flown to Afghanistan, where he was held in a filthy cell for months
and interrogated repeated by U.S. intelligence agents. Id. The man, whose surname is el-Masri and who
was traveling on New Year's Eve 2003 to take a break from his difficult family life, was denied access to
German embassy officials during the entirety of his months-long ordeal, yet was never charged with a
crime. Id. El-Masri's story has yet to be proven, but analysis of his hair, which can show
malnourishment as well as where on earth a person has been. Tests demonstrate that he was mistreated
and may have been in Afghanistan in early 2004, which coincides with the time frame of his story. Id.
Before flying him to Afghanistan, his seven or eight masked captors beat him "from all sides," tore off his
clothes, including his underwear, stuck him in diapers and a sweatsuit, and drugged him. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Los Angeles Times traced a the ownership of a plane following the same
route that same night to a Massachusetts firm with reported ties to the CIA. Id. On the thirty-seventh day
of a hunger strike el-Masri conducted while in Afghanistan, an American doctor force-fed a chocolate-
tasting fluid through a tube placed in his nose. Id. The man ultimately was dumped from a van, unshaven
and unkempt, in the mountains of Albania. Id. When he retumed home to Germany, he found that his
wife and four children had gone to Lebanon, though he was able to track them down. Id.; see also They
Beat Me From All Sides, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,, 13
90080,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (describing further violations). The story in the London-based
GUARDIAN adds:
With no way to prove his story, el-Masri's account remains ... a terrifying snapshot
of America's 'war on terror.' . . . An investigation by the Washington Post
suggested that the US held 9,000 people overseas in an archipelago of known
prisons (such as Abu Ghraib in Iraq) and unknown ones run by the Pentagon, the
CIA or other organisations. But this figure does not include others 'rendered' to
third-party governments who then act as subcontractors for Washington, enabling
the US to effectively torture detainees while technically denying that it carries out
torture.
Id.; Tracy Wilkinson, Italy Orders Arrest of 13 CIA Operatives, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at Al.
Agents from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly kidnapped a radical Egyptian imam from the
streets of Milan and flew him to Cairo, where he was imprisoned, beaten, and given electrical shocks to
his genitals. Id. Italian prosecutors reported that the imam "had been detainded for a long time and had
undergone physical violence to make him respond to his interrogators' questions." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). That the CIA defends extraordinary renditions by saying destination countries assure the
agency that suspects are treated well, id., is laughable considering that the reality is so starkly and brutally
to the contrary; Richard A. Serrano, FBI Agents Complained of Prisoner Abuse, Records Say, L.A.
TtMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at Al. Additionally, a June 2004 FBI report catalogs abuses committed by military
personnel or their hired mercenaries (euphemized as "contractors") in America's archipelago of military
prisons from Cuba to the Middle East, such as "strangulation, beatings, placement of lighted cigarettes
into detainees' ear openings and unauthorized interrogations." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
One Abu Ghraib prisoner told FBI agents that he was handcuffed and put into the "Scorpion" hold, an
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B. A Brief History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, "one of the most venerable of the
evidentiary privileges in Western jurisprudence," dates back more than two
millennia to ancient Rome.44 Indeed, in Roman times there was no waiver of
the privilege based in part on the custom that the lawyer must not betray
confidences.45 An attorney's testimony regarding his client was viewed as
"completely valueless," because in testifying on behalf of his client, the
attorney had a strong motive to lie and was therefore not credible; yet if the
attorney testified against his client, he was disreputable and thus not to be
uncomfortable physical position, then "doused with cold water, dropped onto barbed wire, dragged by his
feet and punched in the stomach." Id. A Guantdnamo Bay detainee was beaten and had his head slammed
onto a floor, knocking him unconscious, after he tried to protect himself from being spat upon. Id.
Another, after spending the night in an unventilated room in which the temperature topped 100 degrees,
was found "with a pile of hair next to him... [having] been literally pulling out his own hair throughout
the night." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Others were chained in the fetal position to the floor,
without food or water or even a chair, and some "had urinated or defecated on themselves, and had been
left for 18 to 24 hours or more." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Richard A. Serrano, Military
Report on Guantanamo Highlights Danger ofAl Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, at Al. A more recent
report confirms widespread abuses at Guantdnamo Bay's Camp Delta "[T]he military has been pounded
with allegations that prisoners have been abused and humiliated to get them to talk," undermining the
credibility of the information gathered. Id. A recently released man told the Los Angeles Times "about
prisoners at Camp Delta being hit, kicked, sexually humiliated and made to fear for their lives." Id.
43 See infra note 207 and Part IV, C (detailing the Sixth Amendment violations).
44 Marjorie Cohn, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: The Evisceration of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2003); Ken M.
Zeidner, Inadvertent Disclosure and the Attorney-Client Privilege: Looking to the Work Product Doctrine
for Guidance, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2001) ("The notion that an attorney may not give
testimony against his client is deeply rooted in Roman law."); Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential
Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1927-28) ("Advocates from very
ancient times could not be called as witnesses against their clients while a case was in progress. Cicero in
prosecuting the Roman governor of Sicily regrets that he cannot summon the latter's patronus,
Hortensius.... ").
45 Radin, supra note 44, at 489. "[N]o act of his client could give [the lawyer] the right to
testify," so the lawyer was immune having to testify. Id. This author, writing in the early 20th century,
begins his article with a humorous (from the lawyer's perspective) comparison of lawyers and doctors and
words of reassurance for those who aspire to the legal profession, and he includes a reminder that public
vituperation of lawyers is not necessarily a new concept:
The profession of the law, for all the hard words laymen have said and say about it, is
concededly an ancient and highly honorable calling. While the origins of medicine are to
be found among mutterers of spells and hawkers of herbs, one class of experts in law in
Western Europe were at all times-from the days of the Roman republic to our own-
markedly gentlemen.
Id. at 488. Lawyers in France, for example, were seen as "noblesse de la robe," while in Scotland they
also occupied the realm of nobility. Id. That as gentlemen they were obliged not to betray confidences
has been said to be the basis of the attorney-client privilege. Id. But there was another theory: The
lawyer, as servant to his client, "however honored and influential a servant ... must keep his master's
secrets." Id.; see Zeidner, supra note 44, at 1320 (noting that attorneys were "completely incompetent as
witnesses in cases in which they acted as counsel").
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46believed. The policy rationale behind the Roman approach was based on
the notion that conserving the confidences and trust among family "and
quasi-family" relations was more important than the "correct settlement of
controversies" or punishment of wrongdoers. 7
At common Anglo and early American law, however, the privilege
became more limited because of "our accepted theory that truth is better than
fides. ' 48 The privilege also came to be seen as a means to limit or discourage
the pursuit of litigation.49  At early common law, the privilege belonged to
the attorney, based on the sixteenth-century notion of protecting the honor of
the legal advisor as a gentlemani 0 However, "we [later] disposed of the
medieval or semi-medieval theory of honor," in favor of maximized truth-
seeking.5' By the eighteenth century ownership of the privilege shifted to the
client "to secure a client's freedom of action when dealing with his
attorney. 
52
Thus the rule protecting attorney-client communications remains
under American case law: a privilege held by the client, limited, and
protected by statutory or common law rather than by the Constitution.53 The
underlying rationale for the privilege enunciated in eighteenth century
England also has persisted through time in American jurisprudence. In 1888,
Justice Fuller wrote for the Supreme Court:
46 Radin, supra note 44, at 488-89; Zeidner, supra note 44, at 1320; Cohn, supra note 44, at
1235.
47 Radin, supra note 44, at 490.
48 Id.; FLOYD L. MORELAND & RITA M.FLEISCHER, LATIN: AN INTENSIVE COURSE 417 (1977).
Fides translates to "faith, trust, trustworthiness." Id.
49 "Litigation is avoided if all facts are unreservedly placed before the legal adviser, and it is
increased if the client cautiously avoids any statement except that which he thinks will support his case."
Id. at 491.
50 Zeidner, supra note 44, at 1320-21. The privilege arose at common law concurrently with the
advent of compulsory live testimony and "commended itself, at the very outset, as a natural exception to
the then novel right of testimonial compulsion." Cohn, supra note 44, at 1235 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2290 (John T. McNaughton rev.ed., 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 Zeidner, supra note 44, at 1321.
52 Id. at 1321. Zeidner points out that another, less discussed rationale for the attorney-client
privilege is that it protects the integrity and furthers the truth-finding function of the adversarial system,
under which each party is charged with marshalling the law and facts to its advantage and offering its own
arguments and theories. Id. at 1325 n.59. Were lawyers to become as loyal to opposing parties and to the
public as to their own clients, "their clients would no longer have lawyers. The clients would only have
judges-a whole series of them." Id. (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, The
Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 72 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But see Radin, supra note 44, at 490 ("The worst that can be said of the duty-privilege..
. is that it seriously impedes the discovery of truth, by withdrawing from possible testimony one who had
the best opportunity for learning the truth."); Cohn, supra note 44, at 1235-36.
53 Cohn, supra note 44, at 1237, 1238. "In the two hundred years since the privilege was
formally recognized in American law, the only serious question concerning its application has arisen just
recently in the context of how to delimit the scope of the privilege of a corporate client.... Aside from
the corporate client debate, the privilege has remained a fairly stable and unchallenged concept in
American law." Id.; Radin, supra note 44, at 490; Zeidner, supra note 44, at 1321.
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The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications
between client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the
interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance
can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.
54
But the privilege, Justice Fuller admonishes, is the client's alone, "and if the
client has voluntarily waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close
the mouth of the attorney.,55  Similarly, in a more recent, well-known case,
Upjohn Co. v. United States,56 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the privilege
encourages "full and frank communications" between counselor and client,
promoting "broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. 5 7
C. Attorney-Client Confidentiality Required for Sixth Amendment
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel to Be Effective
While the right to trial by jury can be traced to the thirteenth century
in England, that nation's Parliament did not statutorily confer upon criminal
defendants the right to representation by counsel until 1836.58 That is not to
54 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
55 Id.
5 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, Petitioner corporation initiated an investigation and sent out
a questionnaire to all of its foreign general and area managers to determine whether its foreign subsidiary
made illegal payments to secure a government business. Id. at 386-87. After petitioner disclosed such
payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service demanded a
production of all the files relating to the investigation. Petitioner refused to produce the documents. Id. at
387. The Court rejected the "control group" test applied by the lower appellate court, concluding that
even low-level and mid-level employees could have the information necessary to defend against the
potential litigation, and that Fed. R. Evid. 501 protected any client information that aided the orderly
administration of justice. Id. at 389-91. The Court also rejected the lower appellate court's conclusion
that the work-product doctrine did not apply to tax summonses, but remanded the issue because the work-
product at issue was based on potentially privileged oral statements. Id. at 398-99. The doctrine could
only be overcome upon a strong showing of necessity for disclosure and unavailability by other means.
Id. at 402.
57 Id. at 389. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Upjohn continued, "The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the
lawyer's being fully informed by the client .... [It] rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to
know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be
carried out." Id. (citation, internal quotation marks omitted).
58 WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8 (1955). The United
States granted this right to all criminal defendants (at least in federal trials) decades earlier upon the
ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791. Id. In England, it was not until 1903 that a statute (the Poor
Prisoners' Defense Act of 1903) provided for appointment of counsel for all accused of felonies, but in the
years between the 1836 and 1903 acts, courts had the authority to appoint counsel for indigents, or
counsel might have come forward to defend murder suspects without charge, and in rural villages, "the
method of payment of counsel was frequently so flexible that legal aid was virtually free." Id. at 12.
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say there was no authority for a defendant's right to counsel at trial prior to
that year, but "[i]llogically" the right was afforded defendants facing
misdemeanors punishable by brief jail terms, while those charged with
felonies such as larceny, robbery, murder or treason-who frequently faced
the death penalty-had no legal right to appear with counsel.59  By the
eighteenth century, the practice of common law courts sua sponte to allow
counsel to argue points of law on behalf of the defendant ameliorated this
seemingly paradoxical rule.6°
In early colonial America, the right to counsel progressed roughly as
it did contemporaneously in England, though the lack of trained lawyers and
judges meant that as a practical matter, the accused frequently defended
themselves.6' Statutory recognition of the right to counsel go an early start
under the Rhode Island Act of March 11, 166062 and the Pennsylvania Frame
of Government of 1683.63 The latter granted parties the right to plead their
59 Id. at 8-9, 11. The defendant did, however, have the right to retain counsel. Id. at 9. For
those accused of treason, Parliament passed a law in 1695 requiring courts, upon request of the accused, to
appoint no more than two counsel for their defense. Id. The rule allowing the right to counsel for those
accused of misdemeanors but not felonies was justified because (1) an impartial judge was to view both
sides in a criminal action with equal suspicion; (2) criminal proceedings were simple enough that any man
could understand what was happening; and (3) it was tacitly acknowledged that the mere fact of having
been indicted for a felony made the accused "at least half guilty," and because the security of the kingdom
was more important than the defendant's liberty, whatever advantage that might be had should go to the
king. Id. at 11.
60 Id. at 9-10. Some courts broadened this practice to allow attorneys also to examine witnesses
on behalf of the defendant, though only the king's counsel could make closing arguments. Id. Blackstone
nonetheless denounced the rule: "Upon what face of reason can that assistance [of counsel] be denied to
save the life of a man, which is yet allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" Id. at 11
(quoting IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 355 (12th ed. 1795))
(alteration in the original).
61 JOHN B. TAYLOR, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER LAW 48 (2004). In some place defendants were allowed the assistance of
others, but those who rendered assistance could not be paid. Id.; BEANEY, supra note 58, at 15 (lack of
trained counsel and judges "made some procedural improvisation necessary in the earlier colonial
period").
62 BEANEY, supra note 58, at 17-18. As the 1660 act granted the right to representation by
counsel in a criminal case, it also underlined the need for such representation:
Whereas it doth appeare that any person... may on good grounds, or through mallice
and envie be indicted and accused for matters criminal, wherein the person that is so
[accused] may be innocent, and yet, may not be accomplished with soe much wisdom
and knowledge of the law as to plead his own innocencye, &c. Be it therefore inacted.
. that it shall be accounted and owned from henceforth ... the lawful privilege of any
man that is indicted, to procure an attornye to plead any poynt of law that may make for
the clearing of his innocencye.
Id. (quoting II RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS 1664-77 239 (Bartlett ed., 1857)) (alteration in the
original).
63 Id. at 16.
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own case or, "if unable, by their friend. . . ."64 As the eighteenth century
began, both Pennsylvania and Delaware passed statutes giving all criminal
defendants "the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their
Prosecutors., 65  The importance of the privilege against self-incrimination
rose with political tensions in the revolutionary war era. By the time the Bill
of Rights was ready for ratification, seven states protected the right to
counsel by their constitutions, four by statute and one via common law.66
Hearkening back to those early days of the Republic, the U.S.
Supreme Court, during the height of the Civil Rights era, held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was sufficiently "fundamental and essential to a
fair trial" as to make it binding on the states through the Fourteenth
67Amendment. In so holding, Justice Black wrote: "Not only [the earlier]
precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him."
6 8
A few years later, the court, citing Powell v. Alabama69 and other
authority,70 made clear that courts long had equated the right to counsel
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the right to effective assistance of
counsel.7' Nonetheless, to overturn a conviction based on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not easy. The defendant must demonstrate
64 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
65 Id. at 16-17. South Carolina followed suit in 1831. Id. at 17.
66 TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 48. Georgia was the lone holdout, inserting the right into its
constitution of 1798. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
ratified along with the remainder of the Bill of Rights on December 15, 1791, provides that the accused in
a criminal case "shall ... have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.
67 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 344-45 (1963).
68 Id. at 344; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). "The right to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Id.; see also
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (citing "particular sacredness" of right to assistance of
counsel).
69 287 U.S. 45. In Powell, the defendants pled not guilty in state court to charges of rape. Id. at
49. Although it was recited that the defendants were represented by counsel upon arraignment, no counsel
had been employed until the day of the trial. Id. The defendants were ultimately found guilty and
sentenced to death. Id. The trial court overruled defendants' motions for new trials, and their convictions
were affirmed by the state supreme court. Id. at 50. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions
and remanded, holding that the defendants were denied their right to counsel in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The Court noted that the defendants' illiteracy, youth, and the circumstances of public
hostility made the necessity of counsel so imperative that the trial court's failure to make an effective
appointment of counsel and the failure to give the defendants a reasonable opportunity to secure counsel
was a clear denial of due process. Id. at 71.
70 E.g. Avery, 308 U.S. 444. "The denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to
consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham
... .The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal
appointment." Id. at 446 (footnote omitted).
71 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). The Court noted that "defendants
facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel." Id.
FEAR OF A BLACKENED PLANET
both (1) that counsel made errors "so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel"' guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment, and
that (2) this deficient performance so prejudiced the defense as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, rendering it unreliable.72 To successfully claim
ineffective assistance, the defendant must point to specific errors made by
counsel that had a prejudicial effect.73 "The right to the effective assistance
of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to
survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.
74
Though the cases have differed somewhat on the exact timing, the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel attaches once the
government has initiated charges against the accused.
75 In Kirby v. Illinois,76
Justice Stewart wrote:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary
criminal justice.... It is then that a defendant finds himself faced
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed
in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is
this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the
'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
77
The right thus extends to investigation and preparation of a defense and,
significantly, it also includes the defendant's right to communicate with an
72 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 91-92.
73 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666 (1984); TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 93.
74 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656. "When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted--even if
defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors-the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries,
the constitutional guarantee is violated." Id. at 656-57 (footnotes omitted).
75 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 689 n.6 (1972).
76 406 U.S. 682 (1972). In Kirby, the defendant was arrested because police thought he was
another suspect who was wanted for a criminal offense. Id. at 684. After police found possibly stolen
travelers checks in possession of the defendant, the victim of a robbery came to the police station and
identified the defendant as the robber. Id. At the time of the identification, there was no lawyer present,
the defendant had not asked for legal assistance, and the defendant had not been advised of any right to
the presence of counsel. Id. After the identification, the defendant was indicted for the robbery and was
arrested. Id. At trial, the victim testified as to the police station identification and also made an in-court
identification of the defendant. Id. at 685-86. The defendant was convicted of robbery, and the state
appellate court affirmed. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. Id. at 691. Although
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel existed at a post-indictment pretrial lineup, the Court refused to
extend the right to an identification that took place before the commencement of any prosecution
whatever. Id. at 688. Because the defendant was identified before he was arrested on the robbery charge,
the pre-indictment identification was admissible, even though counsel was not present. Id. at 691.
77 Id. at 689-90.
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attorney. 78 "Free, two-way communication" between attorney and client kept
inviolate from government scrutiny is required for the Sixth Amendment
protection to be meaningful. 79  Therefore, concludes Professor Cohn, a
violation of the attorney-client privilege violates a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel.80
This proposition is also reflected under treaty law-specifically, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by the United
States on June 8, 1992.81 Under this treaty, a criminal defendant is given the
right to counsel and the right "to communicate with counsel., 82 The right to
counsel arises, as under U.S. common law, once a defendant has been
criminally charged.83 Defendants are guaranteed adequate time and facilities
to prepare their defense, access to documents and evidence required for the
defense, and that the defendant and attorney may communicate "in
conditions giving full respect for the confidentiality of their
communications. ''84 Arguably, then, the United States violates a treaty,
which is binding under the supremacy clause of the Constitution85-- every
time prison officials monitor communications between inmates and their
attorneys.
D. Monitoring Provision Passed During
a Time of Heightened Fears
During the days immediately following 9/11, the nation so was
overwhelmed with fear of another physical attack or act of bioterrorism that
78 Cohn, supra note 44, at 1240 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)); Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-91 (1976)).
79 United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545 (1977); see also TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 90 ("The right to counsel cannot be fully effective unless
defense attorneys have full and unfettered access to the information they need, and clients would not be in
a position to provide such information if they risked the possibility that it could be then used against
them."); United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Unquestionably, government
interference in the relationship between attorney and defendant may violate the latter's right to effective
assistance of counsel.").
80 Cohn, supra note 44, at 1240.
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 14(3)(b), 14(b)(d),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 [hereinafter ICCPRI; 138 Cong. Rec. 8068, 8070 (1992); SCOTT N. CARLSON &
GREGORY GIsVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 235 (2003); SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLMCAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 866 (2d ed. 2004); Cohn, supra note 44, at 1248.
82 ICPPR, supra note 81, arts. 14(3)(b), 14(b)(d).
83 JOSEPH, supra note 81, at 437; see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing
when Sixth Amendment rights attach).
84 CCPR-Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, 21st Sess., (1984), 9, quoted in
JOSEPH, supra note 77, at 429, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Jan. 15, 2006); see also
CARLSON & GISVOLD, supra note 81, at 45 ("When an accused is discussing his or her defense with
counsel, an environment ensuring confidentiality of communications must be provided.").
85 U.S. CONST. art. VI; Cohn, supra note 44, at 1248.
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nary a peep of protest was raised against the array of extreme policies
86emanating from a shadowy Washington. For example, the public stood by
as the government rounded up and detained 1200 people without identifying
them, the charges they faced or whether the had access to counsel; opened
the door to FBI snooping on individuals living in the United States; and
allowed agents to listen in on conversations between inmates and their
lawyers.87 At the time these policies were pushed through, the public was
afraid of further assaults or of appearing "unpatriotic.' '88 The anthrax scare
added to the already high level of fear at that time.
89
Bush Administration leaders further fomented fear. Former Attorney
General Ashcroft, for example, proclaimed, "The American people face a
serious, immediate and ongoing threat from terrorism.' 9 Two years after
the attacks, General Franks, who headed the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq,
told a cigar lifestyle magazine that should the United States or another
56 Naftali Bendavid, Anti-terror laws face little challenge, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 11, 2001, at
Cl.
87 Id.; CASSEL, supra note 2, at xii-xiii ("[S]ecret lists govern whether you can get on an
airplane, open a bank account, or buy a house;.., new laws allow the government to search your home,
your bank records and your medical files without your knowledge of the search itself or the information
obtained"); Tim Weiner, Look Who's Listening; The C.I.A. Widens Its Domestic Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2002, at 1. Even though its charter specifically precludes it from engaging in domestic policing, the
CIA was given by Congress, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, billions of dollars and "new legal powers
to snoop on people in the United States." The CIA "is now permitted to read secret grand jury testimony,
without a judge's prior approval." Id. "It can obtain private records of institutions and corporations
seized under federal court-approved searches." Id.; see also, David McCormack, Can Corporate
America Secure Our Nation? An Analysis of the Identix Framework for the Regulation and Use of Facial
Recognition Technology, 9 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 128, 134-35 (2003) ("In the wake of September 11,
law enforcement, public officials, and politicians began to explore new uses for facial recognition
technology."). The author cites "Orwellian concerns" regarding the use of such technology, such as
recording intimate and private conduct, targeting political opponents or racial minorities, and sharing
information gathered with this technology among governmental agencies for purposes other than national
security, actions that "could lead to the growth of a police state." Id. at 135; Frank James, Security Tips
Scale as Nation Balances Privacy Concerns, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 27, 2001, at 5 (noting that the new
security measures "expanded the government's ability to conduct secret searches of homes and offices and
reduced court oversight for law-enforcement surveillance of phone and Internet activities").
88 Bendavid, supra note 86. "These are measures passed in a moment of crisis, fear and anxiety,"
a University of Wisconsin historian told the Chicago Tribune. "That is a recipe for creating bad
legislation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 E.g. Josh Myer & Megan Garvey, New Anthrax Case Feared in Northeast, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2001, at Al.
90 Bendavid, supra note 86. Such fear-mongering has not been confined to the United States.
England's former home secretary, David Blunkett, defending of a bill allowing police to detain suspected
foreign terrorists indefinitely, went so far as to ridicule the concept that the public may enjoy civil rights
at all when he said, "We can live in a world with airy-fairy civil liberties and believe the best in everybody
and they destroy us. But that is not the world we live in." Tom Tickell & Dorota Nosowicz, Quotes of the
Year: What They Said in 2001, The OBSERVER (London), Dec. 30, 2001, at 28; see also 2001: The Year
History Exploded, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Dec. 29, 2001 (reciting the story of a man among hundreds
rounded up after 9/11 "for no better reason than his religion and nationality," and who was cleared of any
links to the attacks but who died of a heart attack in jail 35 days after his detention, U.S. immigration
officials remained unapologetic for the general infringement of civil liberties, because "[t]his is a time of
war, and we are on a war footing.").
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Western nation again be subjected to a large-scale attack, "the Constitution
likely will be discarded in favor of a military form of government."91 One
retired University of Washington professor recently wrote that the Bush
Administration's antics have "turned promoting and exploiting public fear
into an art form that Joseph Goebbels would envy.
92
Ultimately the 9/11 attacks were seen by many as a signal that the
safe world Americans had once known was gone, to be replaced by an
unpredictable and eminently more dangerous world.93 However, the better
explanation is not that the attacks made the world more dangerous but that
they served as a reminder of how dangerous the world already was.94
1. Response to Terrorism Fear Intertwined with Bush Administration Push
to Silence Critics, Further Federalize Criminal Prosecution
Generally speaking, the government's response to 9/11, though no
doubt underlain by the fear of a repeat attack, appears to have become
entwined with the Administration's political agenda. The result has been the
targeting of Bush policy opponents.95 This is not a new concept. Afraid that
Soviet spies were pumping U.S. librarians for key information that could
help their country, the Cold War-era FBI investigated library employees.96
91 John 0. Edwards, Gen. Franks Doubts Constitution Will Survive WMD Attack,
NEWSMAX.COM, Nov. 21, 2003, http://www.newsmax.comarchives/articles/2003/11/20/185048.shtml
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006). General Franks offered this assessment of what would happen were the
United States or another Western nation to be attacked with a weapon of mass destruction: "[T]hat causes
our population to question our own Constitution and to begin to militarize our country in order to avoid a
repeat of another mass, casualty-producing event. Which in fact, then begins to unravel the fabric of our
Constitution. Two steps, very, very important." Id.
92 Hubert G. Locke, It's Not Your Father's America Any More, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/217447_locke25.html.
93 E.g. Rupert Cornwell, The Shadow of Terror: So This is History?, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 27, 2001, at 7.
94 Id.
95 For example, a recognized member of the press was "quickly and aggressively removed" by
two men who appeared to be Secret Service agents after he asked a question of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld at a speaking engagement in Los Angeles. Press Release, Pen Center USA, Reporter
Removed After Questioning Rumsfeld, Aug. 18, 2005, http://penusa.org/go/news/comments/424. The
reporter for U.S. Tour of Duty, an organization of veterans of the Iraq War and their families, had asked
Rumsfeld, "Military families think you're lying to them. Why won't you meet with them?" Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The men who hauled the reporter out of the speaking engagement first said
they were going to hold and question him, but queried further by the reporter, "became vague and
contradictory in their responses" and ultimately told him he was not actually being detained and was free
to go. Id. Others at the speaking engagement were similarly treated; a mother tried to ask Rumsfeld
about his inconsistent statements on the war in Iraq but "was prevented from speaking by nearby
security," and peace advocates were dragged away after attempting to unfurl a banner criticizing
Rumsfeld for lying to the public. Id.
96 FOERSTEL, supra note 2, at 32-34.
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Criticism, of course, was characterized as Soviet-instigated.97  Yet a
congressional committee that looked into the matter could obtain no
evidence to support the theory that Soviet spies were scurrying around U.S.
libraries, collecting key technical information.98 Today, the label for a
President's political opponents has been updated from "communist" and
"Soviet" to "terrorist."99 As an example of the absurd lengths to which this
practice has been taken, Education Secretary Rod Paige defined an
organization that represents school teachers, the National Education
Association, as "terrorists" because they opposed President Bush's school
funding program.'l°  Additionally, officials trotted out the "terrorist"
sobriquet to describe and vilify those who planned to protest Republican
policy during that political party's 2004 national convention in New York
City.
10 1
Three incidents recounted by the Sacramento Bee newspaper further
illustrate this point. The first conjures Cold War imagery of the Soviet
Union's infamous KGB: A New Mexico public defender commented during
a political discussion that "Bush is out of control" and was overheard; he
later found himself surrounded by four police officers while using a library
computer, handcuffed, detained by Secret Service agents and interrogated as
to whether he was a threat to the President.10 2 In another incident, a retired
phone worker, following an intense debate in a San Francisco gym during
which he criticized Bush and the bombing of Afghanistan, was awakened in
his apartment by FBI agents who sought to talk to him about his political
beliefs. In the third case, two middle-age peace activists were barred from
97 Id. at 34 (section entitled "Paint the Critics Red"). "Fixated on communist subversion, the FBI
tends to see all dissent as emanating from Moscow." Id. at 35 (quoting John N. Berry Ill, Editorial: Little
Shops of Subversion, LIBRARY JOURNAL, Dec. 1989, at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Id. at 34-35.
99 Amazingly, though, there are those who apparently persist in the belief that communism still
lurks in Latin America, ready to menace the capitalist nations of the Western Hemisphere. For example,
Televangelist Pat Robertson, in issuing his much-maligned call for the assassination of Venezuela
President Hugo Chavez, expressed fear that Chavez would make his nation "a launching pad for
communist infiltration .... James Gerstenzang & Larry B. Stammer, A Cail for Assassination Brings a
Cry of Outrage, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at AI (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 181.
101 E.g., Bryan Virasami, GOP Convention Threats; Threats led to fingerprints; Top police
official says terror fears convinced cops to verify IDs of hundreds held that week, NEWSDAY, Oct. 27,
2004, at A05; see also CASSEL, supra note 2, at 179 (noting that the BI conducted surveillance of antiwar
groups on suspicions that they might train their members in terrorist tactics).
102 Sam Stanton & Emily Bazar, Security Collides with Civil Liberties, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept.
11, 2003, available at http:llwww.sacbee.com/contentlnews/projectslliberty/storyn7457444p-8400138c.
html. This incident recalls the saying prevalent in modem Cuba, "The walls have ears." See, e.g., Daniel
Swift & Turi Munthe, From Cuba, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2003, http://www.thenation.com
doc/20030407/dispatches/14 (quoting Cuban journalist explaining why she could not discuss anti-war
protesters. The writer notes that when she gave this explanation, "[w]e were sitting in an open square, a
hundred yards from any wall").
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boarding a plane to Boston to visit family and interrogated for hours because
their names came up on a secret government "no fly" list.
10 3
The response by the government-and especially the executive
branch-to 9/11 also has resulted in the expansion its authority criminal
enforcement and prosecution, as illustrated by the proposed Domestic
Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Patriot H). 1°4 This proposal would, inter
alia, allow the DOJ to subpoena and compel attendance and testimony from
witnesses of terrorism-related crimes and to bar the recipient from disclosing
that the subpoena was received to anyone other than an attorney while
seeking legal advice and in other limited circumstances; 0 5 add witnesses and
their attorneys to those who may not disclose a matter occurring before a
grand jury; 106  strictly limit injunctive relief from law enforcement
103 Id. "The government is treating us like we are all terrorists," a 36-year-old Iranian immigrant,
who spent nearly a year in jail over a deportation order he. ignored, told the Sacramento Bee. "We are not
all the same ... What kind of Constitution is this? What kind of democracy is this?" Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Id.; Sara Kehaulani Goo, Report Faults TSA on Privacy, WASH. POST, Feb.
13, 2004, at A07. With respect to no-fly lists, it also should be noted that the U.S. Transportation Security
Administration's plan to screen airline passengers did not adequately protect consumer privacy and
against identity theft, and in particular, there was no way for passengers falsely identified as suspected
terrorists to clear their names. Id.; Sara Kehaulani Goo, Data-Sharing Fails European Vote, WASH.
POST, April 1, 2004, at AI5. Because of its lack of privacy protection, the passenger-screening system's
full implementation may have suffered a setback when the European Parliament issued a resolution
opposing the European Commission agreement to have European airlines provide personal passenger
information to U.S. customs officials. Id. The system, known as Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-
Screening System (or by the acronym "CAPPS 2"), would verify passenger identity with the personal
information provided then compare names to those on terrorist watch lists. Id. Passengers would be
given numerical scores based the risk they allegedly would pose to the aircraft, and the score would
determine the extent of security screening a passenger would receive at the airport. Id. CAPPS 2 could
not get off the ground without European cooperation; on the other hand, the Europeans already share
personal passenger information with the United States under a "temporary, informal agreement." Id.
104 A 120-page confidential draft of this proposal, which includes a section-by-section analysis,
was obtained by the Center for Public Integrity and is available at http://www.public
integrity.org/docs/PatriotAct/story-01_020703_doc -l .pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Patriot
11]. This proposal represents a further federalization of criminal enforcement, which traditionally is the
province of state governments. In the late 20th century, the federal government expanded its role in
criminal enforcement against especially white-collar criminal defendants; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001;
United States v. Rodgers, 466 US 475 (1984) (criminalizing material false statements knowingly made to
a government agency or department); 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1343 (criminalizing mall and wire fraud);
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10(b)-5 (criminalizing insider trading); 18 U.S.C. § 201
(criminalizing bribery of a public official); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (criminalizing extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(involving computer-related crimes); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FEDERAL LAWS
PROVIDING FOR THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=147
(last visited Jan. 15, 2006). Additionally, the federal government in 1994 expanded the federal death
penalty to cover 60 different crimes, most involving murder. Id. Considering that this nation was
founded on the principle of limiting federal government, the value and propriety of the federal
government's continual expansion into criminal enforcement are, to say the least, open to question.
105 The recipient would also be able to disclose receipt of the subpoena to those to whom
disclosure is necessary to comply with the subpoena and anyone else designated by the attorney general.
Patriot II, § 128(d).
106 This nondisclosure would apply if the witness were notified of the requirement and if there
were reason to believe that disclosure would result in a threat national security or the physical safety of an
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surveillance;'0 7 and expand the circumstances under which the President
could order electronic surveillance without a court order. 108
The Patriot Act itself contains, in section 802, a troubling definition
of "domestic terrorism" that is so broad that it easily could be used to target
political dissenters or dissident groups. 109  According to § 3, domestic
terrorism involves acts "dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or any State" that appear to be intended
"to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion," and
the acts occur "primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."" With this definition, the Patriot Act could be used to chill
dissident speech by accusing environmental, anti-globalization and anti-
abortion activists of acting as "domestic terrorists.""' 1 After all, acts of civil
disobedience, which form a common currency of communication among
such groups, could be construed as "dangerous to human life," against
criminal laws, and intended to influence government policy "by intimidation
or coercion."' 1
2
2. Response to Terrorism Fears Could Undermine
Immigrant Cooperation in Criminal Investigations
The United States has a long history of detaining or deporting
perceived enemies who have not been shown to pose a specific or articulable
harm to the nation's security. 13  For example, it is widely known that
President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War suspended the writ of
habeas corpus, allowing the military to detain without charge tens of
thousands of civilians suspected of disloyalty to the Union.' 14 The detainees
were to be "liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or military
commission."115
individual, tampering with evidence, flight from prosecution, intimidation of a witness, or serious
jeopardy to an investigation. Id. § 206 (proposing to amend FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)).
107 Id. § 312.
108 Id. § 103.
109 NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 44-45 (2002); Patriot Act, § 802, 115 Stat.
376, 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2001).
110 Patriot Act, § 802, 115 Stat. 376, 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
II CHANG, supra note 109, at 45.
112 /d. at 44-45.
"3 See generally id. at 37-42.
114 Id.
11 Id.; Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 15-16 (1866); Cruz Reynoso, The Lawyer as a
Public Citizen: Eleventh Annual Frank M. Coffin Lecture, 55 ME. L. REV. 335, 346-47 (2003); LiezI
Irene Pangilinan, "When a Nation is at War": A Context-Deptendent Theory of Free speech for the
Regulation of Weapon Recipes, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 683, 716 (2004); Akhil Reed Amar,
Architexture +, 77 IND. L.J. 671,697 (2002).
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Though Lincoln lacked the constitutional authority to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus, Congress subsequently validated Lincoln's action by
passing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863.116 Congress passed this measure
following a case in which U.S. Supreme Court Justice Roger Taney, sitting
as a circuit court judge, ordered the release of a civilian who had been
detained by the military in a fort. 117 He declared that the President lacked the
constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.' 8 Justice Taney
found that the military was obligated to pass any evidence of the defendant's
wrongdoing to the district attorney. 1 9 He noted that because the courts of
the state of Maryland and the United States were operating without
obstruction or resistance, there "was no reason whatever for the interposition
of the military.' 20 Even the specter of such an interposition caused Justice
Taney great concern:
I can only say that if the authority which the [C]onstitution has
confided to the judiciary department and judicial officers, may
thus, upon any pretext or under any circumstances, be usurped by
the military power, at its discretion, the people of the United States
are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen
holds life, liberty and property at the will and pleasure of the army
officer in whose military district he may happen to be found.'
21
Just after the Civil War ended, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the habeas
corpus petition of an Indiana citizen charged by the military with inciting
insurrection and other crimes against the state, found guilty and sentenced to
death by hanging.' 22 The Court reversed the conviction, ruling that trials by
a military tribunal of those not connected with the military were
unconstitutional where civilian courts were open and available to try
defendants.
23
116 Steven J. Bucklin, Dedication to the Small Town Attorney: To Preserve These Rights: The
Constitution and National Emergencies, 47 S.D. L. REV. 85, 87 (2002) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 9).
The writ of habeas corpus may be suspended "when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it," but the Constitution grants this power to the legislative, not the executive, branch. Id. Despite
Congress' intention in passing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, it has been seen as "a model of legislative
ambiguity that left it unclear whether the presidential suspensions before the act had always been legal or
were legal only now because of congressional approval." Id. (quoting MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF
LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINcOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 68 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 In Re Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 145 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
118 Id.
119 id. at 152.
120 Id.
121 Id. Quoting the Declaration of Independence, Justice Taney underlined a principal reason
behind the Colonists' decision to separate from England, which was that the king "had affected to render
the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power." Id. at 152 n.3.
122 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6, 7, 107 (1866).
123 Id. at 122, 130. The Court emphasized that the Constitution
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During the early 20th century, following the bombing of the home of
President Woodrow Wilson's attorney general, A. Mitchell Palmer, the
Wilson Administration had up to ten thousand resident aliens interrogated,
arrested, and detained based on their political views. 124  More than five
hundred immigrants were deported as part of the "Palmer raids," even though
not one of them was shown to pose a threat to the United States.
25
Finally, well within the memory of some alive today is possibly this
nation's darkest chapter in its history of targeting perceived enemies, during
which more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were rounded up and
interned in "harsh and punishing conditions" on the perception-though
without evidence on the government's part-that they were collaborating
with Japan in its World War II efforts. 126 Regarding whether such detentions
and round-ups actually benefit the war efforts that underlie their justification,
former California Supreme Court Justice Cruz Reynozo recently argued:
[H]istory has shown that when in the past we have given up our
civil rights, it has not helped improve our security. The Japanese
Americans were loyal Americans and interning them did not help
us fight the Second World War any better. The German
Americans were marvelous Americans, and discriminating against
them did not help us fight the First World War. When Abraham
Lincoln suspended the habeas corpus, all historians agree that it
did not help the North fight the Civil War any better. Are we
accepting the curtailment of our civil rights now simply because
our national political leaders tell us that it is necessary?
1 27
Presently, the government is once again targeting foreigners for
deportation, and authorities are so eager to fill outbound jets with immigrants
that they may be undermining the ability of law enforcement to solve crime
in immigrant-heavy neighborhoods. In particular, the Los Angeles Police
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any
of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to
preserve its existence ....
Id. at 120-21.
124 CHANG, supra note 109, at 39.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Reynoso, supra note 115, at 346-47. Two thirds of those rounded up and interned were U.S.
citizens. Id.
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Department (LAPD) has proposed to abandon a decades-old policy, known
as Special Order 40, creating a firewall between local street officers and U.S.
immigration authorities. 128 The Los Angeles County and Orange County
sheriff's departments, which patrol expansive swaths of Southern California,
recently have implemented similar policies.1 29 The purpose of policies such
as Special Order 40 is to encourage illegal immigrants who have been
victims of or witnesses to a crime to cooperate with law enforcement without
fear of deportation. 30  In Southern California, home to millions of
immigrants from Latin America, law enforcement agencies have begun
lifting the prohibition against cooperation by local police officers with U.S.
immigration authorities.
1 31
Police agencies large and small across the country, however, are
changing their approach, justifying the change as a means to reduce offenses
caused by suspected members of street gangs. 132 One LAPD officer viewed
the change as "another tool to get rid of these gangsters."' 33  However,
immigrants and immigrant groups are not convinced that the police agencies'
designs are benign. "We don't want the LAPD to be stalking horses" for the
federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, said one
immigrant group representative. 134 An immigrant who had suffered eleven
years of domestic violence said she "would never have contacted the police
no matter how much abuse there was" had the firewall between police and
ICE not existed, because she would have been afraid that her immigration
status would become an issue.
135
While these efforts by Southern California police agencies may not
punish individuals for their political views as was the case in the Palmer
raids, they may, as was the case with internment of the Japanese-American
citizens and aliens in the 1940s, punish based on race. Law enforcement's
stated reason to "get rid" of street gang members is aimed de facto at black
and Latino youths. 136  Moreover, as mentioned by immigrant group
128 Id.; Susana Enriquez & Richard Winton, Officers Back New Vision of Sanctuary, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 2005, at B 1. Special Order 40 was adopted by former LAPD Chief Daryl F. Gates in 1979. Id.
129 Solomon Moore, Baca's Plan to Screen Inmates OKd, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at B;
Richard Winton & Andrew Blankstein, Agency Shifts on Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at
B.
130 Enriquez &Winton, supra note 128.
131 E.g. Richard Winton, Department Clarifying Rule on Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, March 31,
2005, at Al.
132 Enriquez & Winton, supra note 128. One officer told the Los Angeles Times that "[y]ou are
not going after the produce seller or the ice cream guy-people trying to make a living. You're going
after violent gang members who are committing unspeakable acts on immigrants ... I" d.
133 Id.
134 Winton, supra note 131.
135 Moore, supra note 129.
136 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CALIFORNIA QuiCKFACrS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
06/0644000.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). African-Americans constitute about 11 percent of Los
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representatives, it is too easy for what is sold as a means to cull from society
only the those who pose a most violent threat, to turn into a means to "cast[]
a wider net" against illegal immigrants.
137
3. Governance in Secrecy Envelops the Courts: Appellate
Panels Split on First Amendment Implications
Generally speaking, since 9/11 the federal government has been
operating under ever-greater secrecy. For example, the number of
documents government has classified jumped forty percent between 2001
and 2003.138 In 2003 only one fifth as many documents were declassified as
in 1997.139 "[President George W.] Bush has.. .presided over one of the most
closed administrations in modem history, increasing the classification of
documents and defending against any challenges to its secrecy. '' 140 For
example, Ashcroft promised federal agencies to support any plausible refusal
of a Freedom of Information Act request. 14 1  The Bush Administration's
obsession with secrecy has resulted in "secret arrests and trials using secret
evidence, secret terrorist watch lists, and secret federal court dockets."
42
This penchant for secrecy is "the stuff of despots, not
democracies.' ' 143  Unfortunately, it has seeped into the judicial branch.144
Angeles' population and Asians 10 percent, with whites and Latinos closely splitting the remainder. Id.
However, of the 112,000 supposed members of Los Angeles gangs listed in the CAL/GANG database
used by law enforcement to track alleged gang activity, only 2000 are white, while about two thirds are
Latino and one third black. Id.; Linda S. Beres and Thomas D. Griffith, The Rampart Scandal: Policing
the Criminal Justice System: Criminalizing Youth, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 747, 761-62 (2001). Using
LAPD gang-crime data, professors Beres and Griffith calculate, as a means of illustrating the extent to
which the CAL/GANG database overstates membership in criminal gang members, that each gang
member statistically commits a crime only once every fifteen years. Id. at 762. "Unless gang members
are a surprisingly law abiding group, the gang database includes many individuals who have ended their
gang involvement or who never were gang members in the first place." Id.
137 Andrew Blankenstein, Proposed LAPD Immigrant Policy Raises Fears, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2005, at B4. "Immigration should be totally separate from crime enforcement," a community organizer
told the Los Angeles Times. "The [policy] change could give way to abuse." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
138 Edward Epstein, White House Takes Secrecy to New Levels, Coalition Reports, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Aug. 27, 2004 at A7.
139 Id.
140 Administration Unbound, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at 16A; Bush also has kept
under wraps presidential papers pertaining to his father, George H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan, robbing
scholars and the public of valuable information. Adam Clymer, Government Openness At Issue as Bush
Holds On to Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al. In general, The Bush administration's "penchant
for secrecy... has been striking to historians, legal experts and lawmakers of both parties." Id.; see also
Bendavid, supra note 86 ("President Bush has dropped a blanket of secrecy over presidential papers,
making it harder for scholars to get access.").
141 Administration Unbound, supra note 140.
142 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 162.
143 Id.
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Hearings for immigrants caught up in sweeps following the September 11,
2001 attacks have been subject to a "complete information blackout."
45
These hearings involved individuals "whom the attorney general has
determined might have connections or knowledge of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks."' 46  Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued an
order (the Creppy Directive) that immigration judges are required to bar the
public, press and family members from "special interest" deportation
hearings and must avoid disclosing the cases outside the Immigration
Court.147 This includes confirming or denying that a specific case is on the
docket or scheduled for hearing.148  The record of the proceeding can be
given only to the deportee's attorney, and even then only "assuming the file
does not contain classified information."' 49 Two federal appellate courts
recently have split on whether the First Amendment countenances such
secrecy in relation to special interest deportation hearings.
a. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft
In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft,150 a consortium of media
groups sought access to special interest deportation hearings, administrative
proceedings which, unlike Article IlI trials, operate under the Executive
branch through the DOJ.151  The court applied the Richmond Newspapers
144 Robert Scheer, The Man Behind the Oval Office Curtain, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 2004, at B 11.
The practice of trying defendants in secret in military tribunals, while utterly ineffective in containing
terror, has "indelibly stain[ed] America's reputation as a leader in democratic principles and endanger[ed]
the lives of American prisoners of war in current and future conflicts." Id. The validity of these tribunals
is highly questionable. Id.; Serrano, supra note 42, at AI3. A recent newspaper article paints them as
little more than a kangaroo court. Id. For example, prisoners attend tribunal hearings unaided by counsel,
some in "utter dejection." Id. Reportedly typical is this description from a transcript of a tribunal hearing:
"Detainee unresponsive. Sat in chair with head down. Did not speak at any time." Id. One detainee,
accused of wearing a brand and model of watch purportedly favored by Al Qaeda bomb builders because
it allows alarm settings of more than 24 hours in advance, explained that it was a piece of personal jewelry
that included a compass that showed the way to Mecca to facilitate daily prayers. Id. "If I had known
[that it was a type favored by bombers], I would have thrown it away. I'm not stupid," the prisoner said,
but the tribunal was "unimpressed" and declared him an enemy combatant. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The attorney of one detainee considered the tribunals a sham and told the Los Angeles Times,
"This whole thing is going to come unraveled big time" once detainees' lawsuits move through the courts.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2002). When defendants
appealed unfavorable immigration rulings to district courts, their names were excluded from the court
dockets; CASSEL, supra note 2, at 115-16; see also Clymer, supra note 140 (noting that the number of
immigrants detained and details of their arrest were kept secret).
14 North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 199.
147 id. at 199, 202-03. "[T]he courtroom must be closed for these cases-no visitors, no family,
no press." Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 2002).
149 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
151 Id. at 199, 207.
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"experience and logic" test (experience and logic test),15 2 finding that under
neither prong did the media plaintiffs have a right to access to the deportation
hearings and upholding the constitutionality of the Creppy Directive.
53
Under the experience prong, while the court found an "unbroken,
uncontradicted history" of access to criminal trials-and that access to civil
trials under common law was "beyond dispute"154 -- it found various
examples in which administrative hearings were not held publicly.'55
The court then averred that in assessing the logic prong, not only
should it consider the positive role of openness, but also "the extent to which
it impairs the public good."'156  Toward that end, the court clearly was
persuaded by the declaration of an FBI counterterrorism specialist who
relayed concerns that through open deportation hearings terrorist
organizations could acquire key information on government investigations,
learn how to enter the country more easily, elude government detection by
changing or rescheduling plans for future attacks, and even interfere with
proceedings by tampering with evidence or witnesses. 157 The court evinced
no willingness to second-guess the executive branch in the area of national
security. 158  Consequently, the court found that open special interest
152 Though later formalized in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986), the
experience and logic test was first enunciated in by Justice Brennan in a concurrence in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). According to the test:
First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience,
we have considered whether the place and process have historically been open to the
press and general public. . . . Second, in this setting the Court has traditionally
considered whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question.... These considerations of experience and logic are,
of course, related, for history and experience shape the functioning of governmental
processes. If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience and
logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.
Press Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8-9 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted). The presumption of
openness may be overcome "only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
153 North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 199-202.
15 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the public has a right of access to civil
proceedings, but the five circuits that have addressed the issue agree (1) that Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) governs and (2) that the public and press do have a right to attend civil
trials. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 n.l I (6th Cir. 2002); see also Ky. Press Ass'n v.
State, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 863 (E.D. Ky. 2005) ("[C]ivil trials have historically been open and policy
considerations, like encouraging openness and placing a check on the judicial system, mandate that civil
trials be accorded the same presumption of openness as criminal trials.").
55 North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 205, 209-11; see also id. at 215 (stating that "there is
no fundamental right of access to administrative proceedings").
106 Id. at 217.
157 Id. at 218-19.
158 Id. The court conceded that the concerns raised in the FBI agent's declaration were "to some
degree speculative, at least insofar as there is no concrete evidence that closed deportation hearings has
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deportation hearings did not pass the experience and logic test, noting that
defendants nonetheless enjoy "a heavy measure of due process" through the
Board of Immigrations Appeals and the right to appeal that body's decisions
to a federal court of appeals.
159
The dissent in this case pointed out that DOJ regulations
promulgated in 1964 expressly authorize an immigration judge to hold
closed hearings to protect the public interest. Nevertheless, argued Judge
Scirica, a restriction on a qualified public right of access fails constitutional
scrutiny when a reasonable alternative exists.16° Here, instead of blanket
closure of special interest deportation hearings as provided in the Creppy
Directive, immigration judges should be given discretion to decide case-by-
case whether to close the hearings. 16' In so arguing, the dissent expresses the
better view. Giving a political branch of government carte blanche to hold
secret trials is bad policy. Taking into account that North Jersey Media
Group was argued just a year and eight days after the 9/11 attacks may make
more understandable the court's finding that it was "unable to conclude that
openness plays a positive role in special interest deportation hearings at a
time when our nation is faced with threats of such profound and unknown
dimension."'' 62  However, hiding behind a national emergency as a
justification to govern in secret will not protect the nation in the long run.
Justice Black counseled that "[t]he guarding of military . . . secrets at the
expense of informed representative government provides no real security for
our Republic." 1
63
b. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft
Judicial recognition of government's broad authority to regulate
prevented, or will prevent, terrorist attacks," but it argued that the logic prong itself "is unavoidably
speculative." Id. at 219. The court's logic here is not entirely persuasive, because while deciding whether
public access plays a positive role in the functioning of a government process may involve a sort of
weighing that could be characterized as speculative, the court rightly could be criticized for using
speculative evidence that the public good would be impaired in this case. On the other hand, one can
make the case for openness with evidence that is in no way speculative-it is well documented, even in
North Jersey Media Group. For example, the court pointed out that open trials assure fairness of
proceedings, discourage perjury and other misconduct by participants, prevent against decisions made
based on secret bias or partiality, and help to avert vigilantism by "providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility and emotion." Id. at 205 (quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
573 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221.
160 Id. at 227, 228 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 228.
162 Id. at 220. The court further commented, "The era that dawned on September 11 th, and the
war on terrorism that has pervaded the sinews of our national life since that day, are reflected in thousands
of ways in legislative and national policy, the habits of daily living, and our collective psyches." Id. at
202.
163 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971).
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immigration dates to 1889, when the government's decision to exclude
certain foreigners was found "conclusive upon the judiciary."' 164 The
authority recognized was that over substantive immigration laws and
decisions. 65 The Creppy Directive, on the other hand, goes to non-
substantive decisions, over which the Supreme Court has never deferred to a
governmental assertion of plenary authority where a constitutional right was
recognized. 66  Unlike the North Jersey Media Group Court, the appellate
panel in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft167 found a public right to access
deportation hearings under the First Amendment. 68  As did the dissent in
North Jersey Media Group, the Free Press court found that allowing
immigration judges to determine case-by-case whether to close a hearing
would sufficiently address the government's concern that information
gleaned from an open hearing might be misused by a potential terrorist. 69
Because a First Amendment right was at stake, the court had the authority
place a meaningful limit on a non-substantive immigration law.'
70
Applying the experience prong of the experience and logic test, the
court in Detroit Free Press asserted that deportation hearings traditionally
have, as a matter of "general policy," been public, in part because they "walk,
talk, and squawk very much like a judicial proceeding.' 7' As in civil cases,
a defendant in a deportation hearing has a right to retain counsel (though not
at public expense), to be present at the hearing, to examine evidence against
her, to present evidence on her own behalf, and to cross-examine
164 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 685-86 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
165 Id. at 686.
166 Id. at 686, 688, 693.
167 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). In Detroit Free Press, the
government designated certain deportation cases to be special interest cases and conducted them in secret,
closed off from the public. Id. at 683. Plaintiffs in three separate cases sought an injunction against such
action. Id. at 683-84. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit
granted the injunction finding blanket closure of deportation hearings in special interest cases to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 684-85. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the government's assertion that a
line had been drawn between judicial and administrative proceedings, with the First Amendment
guaranteeing access to the former but not the latter. Id. at 695. Under the two-part "experience and logic"
Richmond Newspapers test, the court concluded that there was a First Amendment right of access to the
deportation proceedings. Id. at 700. The court held that deportation hearings had traditionally been open
to the public, and openness undoubtedly plays a significant positive role in the process. Id. at 700-01.
168 Id. at 700, 705.
169 Id. at 692-93; see supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing when immigrations
judges should close a hearing).
170 Id. at 688, 693; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983) and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)) (noting that
Congress' plenary powers to create immigration law are "subject to important constitutional limitations").
171 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700, 701 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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witnesses. 72 Moreover, deportation is such a serious penalty-it "can be the
equivalent of banishment or exile"-that what is at stake for the defendant is
similar to what is at stake in a criminal case. 173  "It is clear that removal
proceedings are decidedly adversarial" and are "exceedingly formal" and
thus more like court trials than administrative hearings, and they are
presumed open.
174
Turning its attention to the Creppy directive, the Detroit Free Press
court found the order too broad. While the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas
v. Davis'75 instructed that courts may defer to political branches with respect
to "a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals" or in matters of
national security, even in such situations courts are not required to defer to
the political branches' determination of who those particularly dangerous
individuals are. 17 6 Yet the Creppy directive "strikingly lacks" such a
measure of limitation, the Detroit Free Press court found.177 Based on the
notion that limiting special interest cases as outlined in Zadvydas would
allow terrorists to figure out which hearings are open and which are closed,
the government admitted in Detroit Free Press that deportation hearings
even for aliens known not to have links to terrorism will be designated as
special interest cases and held in secret. 78  The court rejected both the
reasoning and the result of the government's argument. 1
79
Addressing the logic prong of the experience and logic test, the court
emphasized the importance of access to such hearings as a check on
172 Id. at 699, 704, Procedurally, removal proceedings resemble civil cases, requiring notice, a
form of service of process and that the government prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
698.
173 Id. at 696. Banishment served a form of criminal punishment under English law beginning in
1718. Id. at 702.174 Id. at 699, 701.
175 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In Zadvydas, two illegal immigrants were ordered deported from the
United States. Id. at 684. Immigration and Naturalization authorities could not locate a country amenable
to receive the deportable aliens, so the aliens were detained indefinitely. Id. Both aliens filed for habeas
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241. Id. at 684-85. The issue before the Court was whether 8
U.S.C.S. § 1231(a)(6) authorized the Attorney General, in his sole discretion, to detain a removable alien
indefinitely beyond the 90-day removal period or only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the
alien's removal. Id. at 689. The Court interpreted § 1231(a)(6) as containing an implicit "reasonable
time" limitation of six months. Id. at 682, 690. The civil confinement at issue was not limited, but
potentially permanent. Id. at 691. Also, the Court noted that these detention provision did not apply
narrowly, but broadly to aliens ordered removed for many reasons, including tourist visa violations. Id.
Moreover, the sole procedural protections available to the alien were administrative proceedings where
the alien bore the burden of proving he was not dangerous. Id. at 692. As a result, the Court vacated the
decisions below and remanded both cases for further proceedings. Id. 702.
176 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691, 696).
177 Id. "The Creppy directive does not apply to a 'small segment of particularly dangerous'
information, but a broad, indiscriminate range of information, including information likely to be entirely
innocuous." Id.
178 Id. at 692-93.
179 Id.
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executive power and a means to ensure that the government "does its job
properly," enhance the perception of integrity and fairness, enable individual
citizens to participate in government and serve as an outlet for community
catharsis in light of the devastation visited by 9/11. 180 In stark contrast to the
court in North Jersey Media Group, which was unable to conclude that
openness played a positive role in deportation hearings,' 8' the Detroit Free
Press Court did not find "one persuasive reason why openness would play a
negative role in the process.'0 82 In a potent defense of the public right of
access, the court added:
The First Amendment, through a free press, protects the people's
right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully, and
accurately in deportation proceedings. When government begins
closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully
belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.
The Framers of the First Amendment "did not trust any
government to separate the true from the false for us."
183
The DOJ's reliance on secret trials, secret detentions, secret evidence and
lack of access to lawyers undermines the Bush Administration's claims that
its war on terror is legitimate. 184 "The most obvious conclusion to be drawn
from these practices ... is [that] the government has weak cases against [the
defendants] that could not withstand judicial scrutiny in any American
court."
1 85
4. Habeas Corpus Relief Can Be Elusive Even When
Those Ensnared by War on Terror Are Citizens
Two cases in which the validity of the government's case against the
accused may be lacking involve the indefinite lock-down of each defendant -
one in South Carolina and the other in Saudi Arabia - without charge or
access to a lawyer. 86 For example, Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen designated by
'go Id. at 703-05.
19' See infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding in North Jersey
Media Group).
182 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705.
183 Id. at 683 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 773 (1972)).
1'4 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 129; Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 5. The government argued that
Guantlnamo Bay detainees have no right to counsel when petitioning for write of habeas corpus. Id.
185 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 129. Noteworthy is that none of the prisoners at Guantinamo or
Americans targeted as "enemy combatants" has been even so much as charged with a crime. But they
have been imprisoned, possibly tortured, kept from their families and held without access to counsel and
the courts. Id.
186 Michael Powell, Lawyer Visits "Dirty Bomb" Suspect, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at A10;
Omar Abu All v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38 (D.D.C. 2004).
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the President as an "enemy combatant" for allegedly plotting with al Qaeda
leaders, was spirited off to a naval brig in South Carolina indefinitely with no
access to a lawyer. 187  "Shortly after the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case, the Pentagon allowed Padilla to meet face to face with a lawyer"-yet
as the attorney told the Washington Post, "this was not an attorney-client
meeting" considering that the government videotaped her meeting with
Padilla, during which the two spoke through a glass security window while
two government agents monitored the conversation. 188 The Supreme Court
heard Padilla's habeas corpus petition but declined to rule on its merits.
89
The Court determined that the district in which he filed the petition lacked
personal jurisdiction, according to the "immediate custodian rule," over the
commander of the military brig at which Padilla was confined.' 90
Unlike the Padilla Court, which declined to reach the validity of the
petitioner's habeas corpus claim,' 9' a district court in Omar Abu Ali v.
Ashcroft found "considerable" evidence that the habeas corpus petition of a
U.S. citizen held at the behest of the U.S. government in Saudi Arabia was
187 Powell, supra note 175.
188 Id.
189 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (2004). Interestingly, the government later filed a
motion with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit seeking an order allowing it to transfer
Padilla from military to civilian custody. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005). The
government further suggested that the court withdraw its opinion in Padilla v. Hanfi, 423 F.3d 386, 389
(4th Cir. 2005), which held that thte president possessed the constitutional authority to detain Padilla as an
enemy combatant in military custody. 432 F.3d at 583. The court denied both the motion and the
suggestion, Id. Taking into account that the government had "steadfastly" maintained for three and a half
years that holding Padilla militarily was "imperative" in the interest of national security, the court noted
that the government's sudden desire to transfer Padilla to civilian custody and withdraw its earlier
decision "compound[s] ... an appearance that the government may be attempting to avoid consideration
of our decision before the Supreme Court." Id. Judge Luttig, writing for the court, further commented
that the government's actions
have left the impression that the government may even have come to the belief that the
principle in reliance upon which it has detained Padilla for this time, that the President
possesses the authority to detain enemy combatants who enter into this country for the
purpose of attacking America and its citizens from within, can, in the end, yield to
expediency with little or no cost to its conduct of the war against terror--an impression
we would have thought the government likewise could ill afford to leave extant.
Id. at 587.
190 Id. "In accord with the statutory language and [the] immediate custodian rule, longstanding
practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present physical confinement-'core challenges'--the
default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held [or
the commandant of a brig, the military equivalent of a warden], not the Attorney General or some other
remote supervisory official." Id. Padilla filed his petition in the Southern District of New York but,
according to the Court, should have filed it in South Carolina. Id. at 2716, 2724. The appellate court in
this case did grant Padilla's petition of habeas corpus, finding a strong statutory and common law
presumption "against domestic military detention of citizens absent explicit congressional authorization."
Id. at 2717 (citing Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 710-22 (2d Cir. 2003)).
191 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004).
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valid.192 Petitioner Abu Ali, a U.S.-born scholarship student at the Islamic
University of Medina in Saudi Arabia who was valedictorian of his Virginia
high school, was arrested by Saudi security officers while taking a final
exam.'93 The United States "orchestrated the detention and was intimately
involved from the very beginning. ' 94 During his detention, Abu Ali had no
access to counsel, was interrogated by Saudi officials and FBI agents, and
allegedly was tortured during the interrogations.' U.S. officials told Abu
Ali and his parents that they would release him if he cooperated. 196
Otherwise, they would leave him in Saudi Arabia to be tried without counsel
or ship him to Guantdnamo Bay where he would be detained as an "enemy
combatant." 1
97
A primary reason, according to Abu Ali, that the U.S. government
was keeping him in Saudi Arabia was so that it could interrogate him without
constitutional scrutiny and because the government was unable to get a grand
jury to indict him in the United States. 198 This lends credibility to any claim
that the government's case against Abu Ali was weak from the start.
Considering cases such as Padilla's and Abu Ali's, in which an American
citizen is held by the military (or a foreign government) at the behest of the
United States and denied counsel, author Cassel comments, "[W]e [now] see
American Citizens removed from the rule of law."' 99 As noted, the Supreme
Court has been decidedly unenthusiastic toward military detention of U.S.
citizens.200
192 Omar Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 38, 68-69.
193 Id. at 31-32. The court found these factual allegations "well-supported," and the government
offered practically no evidence in rebuttal. Id. at 31, 38, 69.
194 Id. at 38.
195 Id. at 32, 36, 38. Abu Ali allegedly had his fingernails removed as a form of torture. Id. An
unidentified witness said he saw Abu Ali "experiencing so much pain in his hands that he was unable to
pick up a pen to sign documents. Id. at 36. An assistant U.S. attorney was quoted as saying "that Abu Ali
'doesn't have to worry about clipping his fingernails anymore"' and that "'he's no good for us here, he
has no fingernails left."' Id. The court found "at least some circumstantial evidence" that Abu Ali was
tortured with knowledge of the United States during interrogations. Id. at 38.
196 Id. at38.
197 Id. On the other hand, Abu Ali's father, who worked for the Saudi embassy in Washington,
D.C., claimed Saudi officials "consistently" told him that his son had violated no Saudi laws and that there
were no plans in Saudi Arabia to prosecute him. Id. at 33.
198 id. at 38.
199 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 129.
200 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (stating that usurpation by the military of
criminal prosecution when civilian courts are open and functioning would leave the life, liberty and
property of every citizen "at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may
happen to be found").
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E. Monitoring of prison communications, pre-Ashcroft
Since the mid-20th century, courts have allowed, for security
reasons, the government to monitor inmates' phone calls to those outside of
201prison. United States v. Paul, in which a criminal defendant sought to
suppress testimony of a monitored phone conversation between an inmate
and a visitor under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (Title I), is illustrative of this practice. 02 In Paul, an inmate
was overheard telling a female over the phone to "bring the material" and
that he would have money. 203 The next day, prison guards took $5 from the
inmate and strip-searched his female visitor, finding no contraband. 204 It was
later discovered, following another monitored conversation in which the
visitor told the inmate that she "ditched the stuff' under a chair in the
205warden's office, that she had attempted to bring hashish into the prison.
The court found the wiretapping permissible under Title III because
it was done within the ordinary course of the prison guards' duties.2°
Federal appellate courts in other circuits have followed this approach.0 7
201 E.g. United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 116 (6th Cir. 1980) ("We do not question the
government's need to monitor prisoners' telephone calls as a security measure.").
202 Id.; Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 802, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522.
203 Id. at 115.
204 Id. at 115-16.
20 Paul, 614 F.2d at 116. Bringing anything onto federal prison grounds contrary to a rule of the
Attorney General is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 Id. at 117. The government had argued, earning the vote of a concurring judge on this
appellate panel, that Title III does not apply to prisons at all. Id. at 116, 117-18 (Phillips, J., concurring).
The concurring judge argued that Title I did not apply because "[slurveillance conducted to maintain
internal prison security lies distinctly outside the threat to privacy that Title 11I was designed to address."
Id. at 118. The government had argued that Title III does not apply to surveillance that does not require a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment, but the court majority "ha[d] problems with this view," preferring
the finding of the district court in this case that Title III did apply, but wiretapping by "an investigative or
law enforcement officer in the course of his duties" is admissible into evidence. Id. at 116, 117 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
207 See, e.g., Gidlay v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 297 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that the monitoring of
Massachusetts inmates' phone calls was lawful); Abraham v. County of Greenville, 237 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2001) (noting that the county's recording of judges' conversations not a legitimate surveillance
activity because it was not carried out in the normal course of the county's law enforcement duties);
United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91, 292 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the defendant's motion
to suppress phone calls made in prison was denied under law a enforcement exception to Title 11I). The
court further reasoned that "no prisoner should expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls." Id.;
Smith v. Department of Justice, 251 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Smith offers an interesting twist on the
typical inmate challenge to corrections department monitoring of phone calls that the inmate initiates or
receives while in prison. In Smith, inmate-appellant spoke with his attorney from prison via telephone,
using a line he knew to be monitored rather than an available unmonitored line. Id. at 1048. During the
phone conversation, appellant claimed, the attorney acknowledged that he provided appellant a
constitutionally inadequate defense. Id. Appellant later sought a copy of the recording of that phone
conversation from the Bureau of Prisons under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Id. The
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Nonetheless, the way was left clear under this line of cases for attorneys to
communicate with their clients about the clients' legal issues without
government monitoring.2 °8 This now appears to have changed with the
revisions the Ashcroft DOJ made to Bureau of Prisons rules.
III. Monitoring of Prison Communications Under 28 C.F.R. 501.3(d)
Federal law defines international terrorism as a violent act which, no
matter where committed, violates any criminal law in the United States, and
which appears to be intended to: (1) intimidate or coerce the civilian
population; (2) influence government policy through intimidation or
coercion; or (3) affect the government's conduct via mass destruction,
assassination or kidnapping. 2°9 The Code of Federal Regulations allows the
Bureau of Prisons to issue special administrative measures (SAMs) by which
a prison warden may place an inmate in administrative detention and limit
such inmate privileges as phone access, correspondence, visiting, and
participation in media interviews where "reasonably necessary to protect
persons against the risk of acts of violence or terrorism. ',210  The time limit
on a SAM is 120 days, but the attorney general can extend the time period
indefinitely.2 1 The Bureau of Prisons adopted these SAMs in 1997.212
More recent rule changes, however, allow the attorney general to
order that an inmate's communications with an attorney that otherwise would
be protected by the attorney-client privilege be monitored where "reasonable
Smith court found that recordings of phone conversations made by prison authorities who routinely
monitor inmates' conversations are admissible into evidence. Id. at 1050.
208 E.g. Smith, 251 F.3d at 1048 (noting that "an unmonitored phone was available" to an inmate
at a federal correctional institution for the purpose of conferring with his attorney).
W9 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2005).
210 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a). A prison warden is authorized to implement a SAM at the direction of
the attorney general, or of the head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency through the
attorney general. Id. Needless to say, the implementation of these SAMs can have significant
constitutional implications. For example, a defendant popularly known as the "shoe bomber," for having
attempted in December 2001 to blow up an American Airlines flight over the Atlantic Ocean by
detonating explosives in his shoes, challenged a restriction on his access to news media. United States v.
Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2004). Specifically, prison officials removed the "letters to the
editor" section of the weekly Time magazine to which Reid subscribed as well as two terrorism-related
articles. Id. at 620. Reid challenged the SAMs on First Amendment grounds, and the district court denied
his motion as moot after the government gave him the two articles. Id. at 622-23. The prison renewed
the restrictions on the magazine, including delaying its delivery by 30 days, reasoning that clipping the
letters to the editor was justified because Reid might receive "coded" messages that might enable him to
continue his criminal activity from jail. Id. at 623. Sounding a skeptical note, the district court wrote,
"[T]his constant reiteration of we've got to keep data away from him, we've got to keep his data out of the
hands of the public lest disaster befall, respectfully, is wearing a little thin." Id. The appellate court
dismissed the case as moot, inter alia, because the SAMs at issue had expired and been replaced by new
SAMs. Id. at 625.
211 Id. § 501.3(c).
212 62 Fed. Reg. 33,730 (1997).
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suspicion exists to believe that [the] inmate may use communications with
attorney or their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism. ''213 Unless
the monitoring is authorized by a court, the prison must notify the inmate and
counsel prior to the monitoring that all communications may be monitored to
deter future acts of violence or terrorism and that communications not related
to attaining legal advice and those that would facilitate a crime are not
privileged.214 This provision seems in part superfluous, because the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege already "breaks the seal of
secrecy" when a client seeks advice for the purpose of committing a future
215crime. To minimize exposure of privileged material to investigators, the
government is to set up a "taint team" separate from those participating in the
underlying investigation to monitor the communications.1 6 However, the
leader of the taint team may divulge privileged material with court approval
or where she or he determines that "acts of violence or terrorism are
imminent., 21 7  Disconcertingly, the prosecution's determination of whether
the attorney-client communications have been used for terrorism related
purposes is not subject to judicial review.21 8
Citing Weatherford v. Bursey,219 the government justifies this
intrusion into the attorney-client privilege by pointing out that the privilege
may not be impaired by the presence of a government informant where an
attorney and client are conferring. 20 In Weatherford, an informant who
213 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
214 Id. § 501.3(d)(2).
215 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("The privilege takes flight if the relation is
abused."); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1989).
216 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3); 66 Fed. Reg. 55062, 55064 (2001).
217 66 Fed. Reg. 55062, 55064 (2001).
218 Katherine Ruzenski, Balancing Fundamental Civil Liberties and the Need for Increased
Homeland Security: The Attorney-Client Privilege After September 11th, 19 ST. JoHN'S J. L. COMM. 467,
478-79 (2005); Eric D. MacArthur, The Search and Seizure of Privileged Attorney-Client
Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 729, 755 (2005). One author seeks to ameliorate the seeming one-
sidedness of this policy by advocating that a court "[alt very least" should require the prosecution to
disclose the privileged information to which it has been exposed so it "can determine whether the
prosecutor's knowledge of privileged material has prejudiced the defendant." Id.
219 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
220 66 Fed. Reg. 55062, 55064 (2001) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 552-54).
Citing to Weatherford arguably is of limited value to the government in trying to justify monitoring of
attorney-client communications in prison, because the attorney-client communications at issue in
Weatherford did not take place in a prison setting. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 547-49. Moreover, the
testimony of an informant who was present during a meeting between the defendant and his attorney that
was found admissible in Weatherford touched not on an overheard conversation with counsel but on a
conversation between the defendant and third parties while counsel was not present. Id. at 553-54. The
Weatherford Court suggested that informant testimony less likely would be admissible were it derived
from a conversation between client and attorney. Id. at 554, 558-59. However, the Court did not come to
a conclusion on this point. Id. at 552-54. Adding strength to the argument that Weatherford provides a
weak underpinning for the government's justification of monitoring attomey-client communications in
prison is that court's contention that electronic surveillance-which the government seeks to conduct
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engaged in an act of vandalism with the defendant met with the latter and his
attorney to discuss trial strategy.221 The informant had been invited and
222agreed to meet as a means to maintain his deception. The court found no
incursion into the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.223
Although the monitor of an inmate-attorney communication could be seen as
an "informant," Weatherford can be distinguished because there the
informant was invited into the attorney-client conversation. This presumably
would not be the case in the prison setting. Beyond being a poor fit as
support for the government's attempt to justify monitoring of attorney-client
communications in prison, the Weatherford holding was plain wrong.
Justice Marshall wrote in dissent: "I cannot join in providing even the
narrowest of openings to the practice of spying upon attorney-client
communications. ,
224
The government further argues that it would build a "firewall"
around the taint team to ensure any privileged information it overheard
would not be shared with an inmate's prosecution team, following the
allowable practice under the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.225 Under the applicable ABA Model Rule, when a
lawyer works for the government then moves to a private firm, the firm is not
disqualified from litigating against the government even if the lawyer
worked in an adversarial position, so long as the lawyer is "timely screened"
from participation and receives none of the related fee, and the government is
notified.226 This is an exception to the general proposition in the private
sector that confidences shared with a lawyer are imputed to the whole
firm. 227  Again, the government's reasoning is suspect, because the Model
Rule that provides for screening applies specifically when a lawyer leaves a
under 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)--is more likely to chill attorney-client communications and thus impair the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel than the mere presence of a third party at an
attorney-client meeting, as occurred in that case. Id. at 554 n.4.
221 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 547-48.
222 Id. at 547-48, 558-59.
223 Id. at 547-48, 558-59. The informant did not share what he learned at the meetings with the
government. Id. at 548.
224 Id. at 562 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that allowing government
informants to sit in on attorney-client meetings both undermines the integrity of the adversarial system
and thus the fairness of trials, and impairs a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at
562, 563.
225 66 Fed. Reg. 55062, 55064 (2001) (citing Blair v. Annontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1333 (8t Cir.
1990); American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Table of Contents,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/nirpc-toc.htmil (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Model Rules].
226 Model Rule 1.11, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_11 .html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
227 Model Rule 1.10, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/nupc/rulel_10.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006);
Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). Of interest is that
California courts apply this rule quite strictly: "[W]here an attorney is disqualified because he formerly
represented and therefore possesses confidential information regarding the adverse party in the current
litigation, vicarious disqualification of the entire firm is compelled as a matter of law." Id.
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government position for the private sector, which is not the case when a taint
team is monitoring attorney-client conversations in prisons. Furthermore, the
purpose of the screening rule is not to facilitate intrusions into the attorney-
client privilege by justifying government monitoring of attorney-client
conversations, but rather to facilitate government recruitment of talented
attorneys by making it relatively easy for them to move to the private sector,
a valuable policy because "attorneys with experience in both sectors are
more useful to the courts, clients, and the government. ,
228
The government's reasoning behind allowing incursions into
attorney-client conversations is not solidly grounded. To be sure, some
writers, haunted by the ghosts and ugly realities brought to light by the 9/11
attacks, argue in favor of a rule change allowing the government to monitor
inmate-attorney conversations. 229  But an appellate court represents the
stronger position by arguing that:
the inquiry into prejudice must stop at the point where attorney-
client confidences are actually disclosed to the government
enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and
prosecuting the case. Any other rule would disturb the balance
implicit in the adversary system and thus would jeopardize the
very process by which guilt and innocence are determined in our
230society.
IV. "District Split": One of Two Washington,
D.C. Courts Finds Breach of Privilege
Only a few cases available to date deal with the attorney-inmate
monitoring provisions in 28 C.F.R. 501.3(d). One of these decisions merely
denies the defendant's motion to order the government to reveal whether it
monitored attorney-client interactions as moot, because under the regulations
the government is required to inform the inmate and attorney of any
recording of privileged communications. 231 Another case, involving noted
New York defense attorney Lynne Stewart, reaches the same result under the
228 Donald R. McMinn, ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased Use of
Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1262-63 (1990).
22 E.g. Ruzenski, supra note 217, at 478-79 (downplaying the incursion to the privilege); Frank
Kearns, Attorney-Client Privilege for Suspected Terrorists: Impact of the New Federal Regulation on
Suspected Terrorists in Federal Custody, 27 NOVA L. REV. 475, 479 (2003). Startlingly, Kearns
characterizes the rule changes as a means to "close[] a loophole that allowed an inmate to communicate
freely with his attorney." Id.
230 Levy, 577 F.2d at 209. This court, therefore, would not permit the government to take the half-
measure of screening.
231 United States v. Esawi, No. 02 CR 038, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1695, *10-*14 (E.D. Ill. Feb.
6, 2003) (order granting/denying defendant's motions) (citing 28 C.F.R. 501.3(d)(2)).
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same theory, but the court in this case offers more specifics as to its
232reasoning. Finally, representing what could be termed a "district split," a
pair of Washington, D.C. courts has examined the inmate-attorney
monitoring provisions. One court declined, on standing grounds, to decide
the merits of the case, and the other found monitoring improper but left in
place a framework so restrictive that it likely compromises the attorney-
client privilege and thus is questionable on Sixth Amendment grounds.233
A. United States v. Sattar - the Lynne Stewart Case
New York defense attorney Lynne Stewart was convicted in
February 2005 of aiding terrorism. 234  Stewart was found guilty of helping
her client, Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, pass a message in which he withdrew
support for a cease-fire in Egypt by his militant followers.235 Abdel-
Rahman, a blind cleric, was serving a life term for conspiring to assassinate
the president of Egypt and destroy New York landmarks.236 Stewart, who
describes herself as "a radical human rights attorney, '237 and who built a
"fierce reputation fighting for the poor, the dispossessed, radicals and
revolutionaries" during her three-decade career, faces 20 years in prison.238
Although Stewart's involvement was key to the prosecution's case,
prosecutors were unable to specify a single act of violence that resulted from
the statement.239
Stewart's radical politics by their nature draw controversy. Her oft-
quoted statement, "[t]o rid ourselves of the entrenched, voracious type of
232 United States v. Sattar, 02 Cr. 395, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798, 2002 WL 1836755
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2002); see infra, Part IV, A (discussing Sattar).
233 AI-Owhali, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 13; Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 1. Another case makes mention
of 28 C.F.R. 501.3(d), but only as it relates to seeking remedies under another provision. Yousef v. Reno,
254 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001).
234 Robert Gearty & Greg B. Smith, Guilty! Lawyer Called Terror Helper, DAiLY NEWS (New
York), Feb. 11, 2005, at 5; Larry Neumeister, Civil Rights Lawyer Convicted of Aiding Terror by Passing
Jailed Client's Messages to Followers, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 11, 2005, at 36. For a
thoroughgoing overview-and criticism-of the indictment and prosecution of Stewart, see Cohn, supra
note 44, at 1249-55; Legal Documents & Transcripts, Justice for Lynne Stewart, http://www.lynne
stewart.org/legal.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
235 Gearty & Smith, supra note 233, at 5; Neumeister, supra note 233, at 36.
236 Gearty & Smith, supra note 233, at 5; Neumeister, supra note 233, at 36.
237 The Lynne Stewart Defense Committee, Who Is Lynne Stewart?, JUsTICE FOR LYNNE
STEWART, http://www.lynnestewart.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
238 David Teather, Lawyer Guilty of Aiding Terrorists Faces 20 Years in Jail, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Feb. 11, 2005, at 18; Julia Preston, New Trial Is Being Sought For Lawyer in Terror Case,
N.Y. TtMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at B3. Stewart has filed a motion seeking that the court declare a mistrial
because a juror failed to disclose during voire dire that he is biased against criminal defendants. Id.
239 Neumeister, supra note 233. Stewart also was convicted for having lied when she made
written promises to abide by SAMs imposed on her client and for conspiring to evade the prison
restrictions. In Brief, Lynne Stewart convicted, but vows tofight on, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 14, 2005, at 3.
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capitalism that is in this country that perpetuates sexism and racism, I don't
think that can come non-violently, ''240 drives her political foes to angry
fulmination.241 On the other hand, her conviction has been cited as an assault
on the First Amendment and the attorney-client privilege. Further, it has
been characterized as a thinly-veiled threat by a politically sensitive Bush
Administration against lawyers who represent "unpopular" clients.242
Professor Cavise pointed out that Stewart merely delivered her client's
statement to the press and "didn't pass any secret codes or messages" to
anyone.243 Highlighting the political nature of the prosecution, the Cavise
argued that typically violations of administrative rules result in
administrative sanctions, not decades-long prison sentences.
244
Moreover, the First Amendment implications of the Stewart case
are profound. However controversial or unlikely her predicted violent end to
the current brand of capitalism may be, expressing this view is entirely legal
under First Amendment jurisprudence.245 Proving that such a statement was
directed at inciting imminent lawless action and was likely to produce such
action is a dubious prospect.246 Addressing one of the crimes for which she
was convicted, Stewart's attorney, Michael Tigar, told a Cardozo Law
School conference: "The obligation of lawyers ... to hold a press conference
to take these controversies into the public forum, is central to what we do."
24 7
In United States v. Sattar,248  Stewart moved to compel the
government to disclose whether it was electronically monitoring
communications with her clients or her counsel under Title 111,249 the
250Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), or the Bureau of Prisons
240 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
241 E.g. Post Details: Lynn Stewart, RANDOM RAVINGS, Feb. 15, 2005, http://www.brendoman.
com/hippydave/2005/02/151ynnstewart (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) ("[Als far as I'm concerned Lynn
Stewart deserves a cell in the Supermax next Omar Abdul Rahman to be gang raped for the rest of her
days.... Stewart is a traitorous dog and deserves to die like one"). Id.
242 Gerald F. Uelmen, Motions FYI: Vagueness; Vindictive Prosecution; Severance of Defendants;
the Case of Lynne Stewart, 28 CHAMPION 36 (2004). Professor Uelmen contends that the prosecution of
Stewart is seen as a "test of how far John Ashcroft will go in harassing attorneys who have the courage
and stamina to defend accused terrorists." Id.
243 Leonard L. Cavise, Commentary: Protect Attorney-Client Privilege, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb.
23, 2005, at 22.
244 Id.
245 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Under the First Amendment, the government
cannot "proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id.
246 id.
247 Cohn, supra note 41, at 1252 (internal quotation marks omitted).
248 United States v. Sattar, 02 Cr. 395, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14798 (Aug. 12, 2002).
249 Title In of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 §802, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522.
250 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
FEAR OF A BLACKENED PLANET
251
regulations allowing attorney-client monitoring in terrorist cases. Stewart
argued that "any interception of attorney-client communications cannot be
justified. '252 Specifically, she contended, because Title III and FISA do not
require notification of the defendant or attorney prior to monitoring, instead
only allowing defendants to later challenge the monitoring, the government's
monitoring under these provisions chilled communications with her attorney,
depriving her of effective assistance of counsel.253 The court rejected this
view, noting that Stewart cited no authority to show that "a bare fear of
surveillance, without more, is sufficient to establish a constitutional
requirement" that the government disclose whether or not it was
monitoring.254 A defendant, the court held, must show that the intercepted
communication "was somehow used against the defendant" to prove a Sixth
Amendment violation when the incursion into privileged communications is
unintentional or justified.255
Unlike under Title III or FISA, the Bureau of Prisons regulations
require that the inmate and attorney be notified in writing of any planned
monitoring prior to any communications.256 Stewart challenged government
monitoring under this provision, but the court appeared satisfied with the
government's assurances that it would follow its regulations and pointed out
that the monitoring under 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) applied in this case only to
defendant Sattar.257 Thus, the court did not reach the issue of whether
monitoring is constitutionally proper or violates the attorney-client privilege.
251 Sattar, 02 Cr. 395, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14798 at *3, *1 1-*12, *12 n.1.
252 Id. at *12.
253 Id. at*12, *18.
254 Id. at *19; see also United States v. Massino, 311 F. Supp. 2d 309, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("To
establish a Sixth Amendment violation, the defendants thus would have to show either that privileged
information was passed to the government and prejudice resulted, or that the government intentionally
invaded the attorney client relationship and prejudice resulted."); Coplon v. U.S., 191 F.2d 749, 759
(D.C. Cir. 1951) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)). Courts, however, have not always
required prejudice to a defendant to find a Sixth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, for example found that "[t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial." Id. The Coplon Court continued, "We think it is further true that the right to
have the assistance of counsel is so fundamental and absolute that its denial invalidates the trial at which it
occurred and requires a verdict of guilty therein to be set aside, regardless of whether prejudice was
shown to have resulted from the denial." Id.; see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 425 U.S. 545, 565 (1977)
(Marshall, I., dissenting) ("A rule that offers defendants relief only when they can prove 'intent' or
'disclosure' is, I fear, little better than no rule at all."). These mid-20th century courts exhibited a more
appropriate level of respect for the requirement that defendants and their counsel confer in private without
government spying, a level of respect that the current bench appears willing to allow the government to
erode.
25' Sattar, 02 Cr. 395, 2002 U.S. DIST. LExis 14798 at *20.
256 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2) (2005).
257 Sattar, 2002 U.S. DISTRICT LExis 14798 at *12 n.1.
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B. A1-Owhali v. Ashcroft
Considering the constitutional implications of the 28 C.F.R. §
501.3(d) monitoring, the district court found that the plaintiffs failed to show
that they had standing.258 As a result, the court did not reach the merits of
the constitutional question posed by the plaintiffs.2 59 Aside from contesting
the constitutionality of the monitoring provision, the plaintiffs, as did Lynne
Stewart, alleged that government surveillance "chills the attorney-client
relationship and deprives the Plaintiff... of the right to discuss any aspect of
his case with an attorney and receive honest advice in return. ' 26 The court
disagreed, reasoning that a mere allegation that a government action chills
constitutional activity without specifying an "immediate threat of concrete,
harmful action" to a plaintiff will not survive a challenge to standing.26'
C. Al Odah v. United States
In the case that most thoroughly examines the Bureau of Prisons
procedures for monitoring of inmate-attorney communications under 28
C.F.R. § 501.3(d)-which were rejected as an intolerable incursion on the
attorney-client privilege-the court nonetheless approved a framework that262
itself is suspect under the Sixth Amendment. In this habeas corpus
proceeding, the government proposed a particularly intrusive program of
monitoring, including real time audio and video monitoring of attorney-client
meetings and review of all material taken to or from such meetings,
including attorney notes, as well as legal mail between inmates and their
counsel. Moreover, the taint team monitoring an attorney-client session
would be entitled to halt the meeting whenever it believed that the prisoner
or attorney was trying to "defeat or frustrate" the surveillance or convey
258 AI-Owhali, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 13, 16.
259 id.
260 Id. at 18-19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
261 Id. at 26 (citing United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted). As an example of a chilled-expression case that survived a standing
challenge, the court cited United Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989). Id.
at 27. There, the plaintiff churches, supported their claim that federal immigration officers abridged their
rights to association, free expression and free exercise of religion by entering churches "wearing body
bugs and surreptitiously recording church services." Id. The churches showed that they had lost
membership and had canceled Bible study classes due to lack of attendance. Id. Furthermore, they
claimed parishioners were less inclined to seek pastoral counseling and less open during confessions and
prayers. Id.
262 Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2004).
263 Id. at 8-9.
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terrorist- or crime-related information that posed an "immediate and
substantial" threat to national security.2 4
Much as in the Lynne Stewart case, the government in Al Odah
feared that attorneys would unwittingly pass coded messages from inmates to
other presumed terrorists.265 Disturbingly, the government appeared eager to
deputize defense attorneys as surrogate interrogators, admitting during a
hearing that it planned to "exploit the 'intelligence value"' of attorney-inmate
interactions-a fact, the court noted, that government attorneys were "careful
to omit ... from their briefs. '266 The court took the government to task for
giving short shrift, in its arguments, to the principle of counsel-client
confidentiality:
The Government's proposal that it monitor these meetings and
conduct a classification review of meeting notes flies in the face of
the foundational principle of the attorney-client privilege. In fact,
the courts have found that intrusion by the government, in
particular, would lay waste to the value of the attorney-client
privilege.
267
The court further chided the government for "attempt[ing] to erode this
bedrock principle with a flimsy assemblage of cases and one regulation. 268
It is worth mentioning that the government additionally argued that
the plaintiffs had no right to representation by counsel in their petition for
habeas corpus.269 In this way, the relationship between the detainees and
their attorneys would be "at the Government's pleasure and discretion,"
allowing it to restrict the relationship in any way it saw fit.270 The court was
likewise unimpressed with this line of reasoning, and, exercising discretion
conferred by statute, found that plaintiffs were entitled to counsel in the
interest of justice.271
This court showed admirable respect for the attorney-client privilege,
resolving to stand firm against a government accustomed to getting its way
264 Id. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
265 Id. Of concern is information regarding prisons, military operations or circumstances of
capture that would violate national security; the government noted that members (and presumably
supporters) of terrorist groups are trained to pass such information and could do so through unsuspecting
attorneys.
266 Id. at 10 n.ll.
267 Id. at 11.
268 Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 12. Regarding the government's citation to 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d),
the court noted that "there is no case law considering the propriety of this regulation, and the mere fact




271 Id. at 8.
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merely by citing necessity based on the war on terror. Yet the court did pay
heed to the national security concerns by approving a framework under
which attorney-client interactions could be constrained.72 Under the
framework, counsel is required to get security clearance "at the level
appropriate for the level of knowledge the Government believes is possessed
by the detainee... ''273 Furthermore, each client is allowed confidential
communications with only one attorney, and that attorney cannot disclose the
privileged information to anyone-not even co-counsel or support staff-
274without submitting it to the government for review. This restriction
applies also to legal mail and attorney notes.275 Considering that the right to
assistance of counsel entails, to maintain fairness in the adversarial system,
the right to effective assistance of counsel, 76 it seems hardly the case that a
defendant could receive effective representation when the attorney
effectively is unable to rely on staff or co-counsel in preparing a defense.
Therefore, while the Al Odah court rightfully defended the attorney-client
privilege of confidentiality, which itself is necessary for effective
277.representation, it allowed for a framework that in effect undermines the
defendant's ability to prepare for trial.
V. Conclusion
For all the governmental secrecy and intrusions into personal
freedoms and privacy entailed in the Patriot Act and related regulation, little
evidence exists that they have averted any terrorist acts.278 In particular, the
272 Id. at 13-14.
273 Id. at 14.
274 Al Odah, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 13 (citing Al-Owhali, 279 F.Supp. 2d at 14). The attorney also
will have to abide by any government decision to approve or prohibit disclosure. Id.
275 id.
276 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (discussing the long established rule
that "the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.").
277 See Levy, 577 F.2d at 209 (explaining the need for open, two-way communication between an
attorney and client in order for the Sixth Amendment to be adequately protected); see also Weatherford,
429 U.S. at 545 ("Unquestionably, government interference in the relationship between attorney and
defendant may violate the latter's right to effective assistance of counsel."); TAYLOR, supra note 61, at 90
("The right to counsel cannot be fully effective unless defense attorneys have full and unfettered access to
the information they need, and clients would not be in a position to provide such information if they
risked the possibility that it could be then used against them.").
278 CASSEL, supra note 2, at 26. "There is no indication that snooping on American's [sic] library
and Internet usage, monitoring antiwar protestors, detaining immigrants, or forcing foreign visitors to
register have done anything to mitigate against future terror attacks. Not one arrest has resulted from these
controversial measures." Id.; Wilkinson, supra note 39. Indeed, the increasingly common, shadowy
practice of extraordinary renditions, by which the CIA seizes persons on foreign locales and sends them to
third countries where they often are subjected to violent and abusive treatment, at least in one instance has
been said not only to constitute a crime in the nation in which the seizure occurred, but an impediment to
progress in reining in terrorism. Id.; Tracy Wilkinson, CIA Said to Leave Trail in Abduction, L.A.
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changes to the Bureau of Prison rules allowing government monitoring of
attorney-inmate communications set a perilous precedent and appear
"designed to chill, if not freeze, the confidential discussions between an
inmate an his attorney that are essential to a well-prepared defense. " 279 This
should be of concern to anyone who values fairness in the adversarial system
of justice as secured by an effective defense of the accused. Such a defense
is especially important here, because "dedicated attorneys are all defendants
have going for them when the government wants to try them with secret
evidence or lock them up indefinitely without trials.
280
The government insists that it will "scrupulously respect[]"
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights281 even as it proposes to eavesdrop on
their privileged communications. But how is one to trust a government that
has, as this Article has detailed, tried defendants in secret, flown or arrested
people in foreign countries and held them for repeated interrogation without
counsel, engaged in torture and other physical and sexual abuses in an
attempt to coerce confessions, and hampered travel of law-abiding citizens
with secret "no-fly" lists? Even if despite these practices the government
generally could be said to function in a trustworthy way, in light of
regulations that undermine the bedrock principle of protecting attorney-client
confidences, a stable feature of U.S. law for more than 200 years, 282 the
words of Justice Bradley resonate: "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in
its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure., 283 It would be unwise for
courts to let the government by "slight deviations" procure a weakening of
the attorney-client privilege and undermine the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.
TIMES, June 26, 2005, at A3. "Not only was [Egyptian imam] Abu Omar's kidnapping illegal in having
seriously violated Italian sovereignty, but it was also an inauspicious act that has contaminated the overall
fight against terrorism," an Italian judge wrote. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the
CIA's extraordinary rendition in this case has developed into a diplomatic headache following an order
issued by an Italian judge for the arrest on kidnapping charges of 13 of the 19 U.S. operatives involved in
the kidnapping of Abu Omar. 1d. Appallingly, the CIA agents involved used their cell phones, driver's
license and passport numbers and frequent flier numbers in a "brazen and perhaps reckless" way so as to
expose their CIA operation. Id. "Although much of the information they provided may have been false,
they seemed to have left a trail worthy of Hansel and Gretel." Id.
279 CHANG, supra note 109, at 87.
280 Id. at 85.
281 66 Fed. Reg. 55062, 55064 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 500 and 501).
282 See Zeidner, supra note 44, at 1320-21 (discussing the history of the attorney-client privilege);
see also Cohn, supra note 44, at 1235 (describing the roots of the attorney-client privilege).
283 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (evaluating the process and procedure for
proper search and seizure).

